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NEWS from Russia becomes progressively more ominous. There is no longer reason for doubting that the factions which insist upon an immediate peace are far more powerful than the western peoples had believed. Nor is there any longer doubt that those factions are permeated with resentment toward Russia's western allies. The publication by the Bolsheviki of the secret agreements of the old régime was clearly intended to widen the breach between Russian sentiment and the common cause, as well as to arouse suspicion among the masses of other countries, Allied or hostile, that the hidden designs of governments cannot stand the test of daylight. No one can safely predict how long the régime of Lenine and Trotzky will last. All the precedents of revolutionary history are against its long survival. But while the present Bolsheviki government lasts it is the business of Allied diplomacy to avoid an open break with it. The suggestion that the ambassadors of the Allies would regard negotiations for a separate peace by the present Russian government as tantamount to a declaration of war upon the Allies can be dismissed as a bit of unconscious pro-Germanism. A Russian peace with Germany would be a severe blow to the Allied cause, but it need endure only so long as the present government endures. A Russian alliance with Germany against the Allies, created by Allied action, might be expected to survive much longer. Moreover, it would pave the way for the formation of a German Eastern European design, more formidable and dangerous to the world than the Central European design we are striving to destroy.

WHATEVER the character of the secret agreements between Russia and her western Allies, there appears to be no good reason why their publication should have been permitted to figure as a trump in the hands of the Bolsheviki. It was not to be supposed that the war aims of Russian Czarism would correspond with those of the Russian democracy. Nor was it to be supposed that the war aims of the Allies, as transmitted to the Czar's government, are identical with their aims at the present time, when Russian imperialism need no longer be reckoned among the complicating factors of international politics. There was obvious reason why the Russian claim to Constantinople, for example, should elicit certain claims on the Adriatic and in Asia Minor on the part of the western Allies. Those claims have doubtless been abated with the withdrawal of the Russian claim. Accordingly, what the Bolsheviki have published must exhibit only an historical situation rendered obsolete by the fact of the Russian revolution. The situation was contaminated with compromises, as was to be expected. It bears on the present situation only in so far as the western Allies have failed to make the revisions indicated by the new state of affairs, or have failed to convey to the Russians in unmistakable terms the more democratic war aims they now cherish.

DISPATCHES from Paris published in the New York World hint that the diplomacy of the Allies in Russia has been weakened by lack of unified action among the representatives of the

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western Powers. How far this is true can not be determined at this time. It would not be strange if it were found that the several ambassadors at Petrograd were not in absolute accord as to the lengths they should go in recognizing the Kerensky government. Their home offices were not in absolute accord, either. It may be surmised that the ambassadors at Petrograd were severally and collectively deeply perplexed about the Russian situation. The Russians themselves appear not to have been too clear as to the possibilities of the future. What is evolving in Russia is something new, for which there are no historical analogies close enough to serve as a basis of judgment. Nor has abstract speculation in this field advanced far enough to help us. Every thinking person has speculated upon the probable character of a socialistic state founded upon a capitalistic economy that has outworn its vitality. Such a state would contain as elements of order a population schooled to organized industrial effort, along with a highly elaborated technique of management and accounting, and an equipment of machinery capable of functioning almost automatically. In Russia at large capitalism had scarcely been inaugurated. The aim of the Bolsheviki is to build a socialistic state out of an antecedent system of feudal tenures and primitive agrarian technique. Is the enterprise one that can possibly move forward in any regular way, or must revolution follow upon revolution, unpredictably?

IN limiting criticism of our Allies, Postmaster Burleson has reckoned without such obstreperous editors as the premier of France. In The New York Times for Sunday the leading article of L'Homme Libre (no longer L'Homme Enchainé) is communicated to the United States. It is a merciless analysis of the cause and effects of Italian disasters. L'Homme Libre does not go into the question of treason. It is quite content to concentrate on the flagrant defects of the general staff, elementary mistakes in strategy, carelessness and recklessness in massing supplies and unscrupulous favoritism in the appointment and retirement of generals. Whatever the merits of these criticisms, their frankness is certainly wholesome; and no one can produce the retort that Premier Clémenceau is skirting sedition or treasonableness. He is obviously doing nothing more than fulfilling the requirements of responsible journalism, without taking as his guide any such false criterion as the susceptibilities of the Italian chauvinist. Dangers lurk in this policy, but it is wiser to risk them than to adopt so fatal a program as the mutual indulgence of mistakes. That is the last word in unreal coöperation.

FROM the New Witness, which is edited at present by G. K. Chesterton, and one of whose founders was Hilaire Belloc, we take this:

> The result of the election of the Mayor of New York is a very important one from the pro-Ally point of view. Mr. Hylan, the successful candidate and a nominee of Tammany, is a strong supporter of the War and an opponent of all those highbrow tendencies which link up with pacifism and find their expression in the pages of the New Republic. His defeat of Mr. Mitchell the highbrow candidate, who stands for prohibition in its worst forms, was to have been expected; an even more sensational victory, however, is Tammany's triumph over the third candidate. Mr. Hillclift, as he calls himself, is a millionaire and has the backing of the German vote in New York. This gentleman's original name was "Hilcovitch," and the 2,000,000 Germans in New York not unnaturally gave him their support. Hilcovitch's complete collapse at the poll shows very plainly that New York has no sympathy with the "stop the war" policy and will not have pro-Germanism at any price. Indeed, the determination of the New Yorkers to carry on the campaign to a successful conclusion, shown by the return of Mr. Hylan, is of immense value at a time when it is more than ever necessary to stiffen our resolution. On this side of the Atlantic, in America as in this country, one inevitably finds that pacifism and prohibition are nearly akin; and we congratulate New York on having overthrown the representatives of both the accursed things.

The New Witness prides itself upon its understanding of America and its interpretation of American opinion. With time and care any American could make Mr. Belloc see that there were mistakes in this paragraph. But no American could ever hope to make him see why it is funny.

IT was wise, beyond doubt, for the Woman Suffrage Association of New York State, in convention assembled, to throw the reprisals plank out of their program. If reprisals had been included in their program their opponents would have said, over and over again, in season and out, in cases when it was true and in cases when it was false, that the suffragists were voting against every candidate opposed to suffrage, in spite of his transcendent merits on other counts. They would have been accused of setting suffrage above everything else in the world, and especially above the successful prosecution of the war. By declining to treat a candidate's opposition to suffrage as of itself a sufficient reason for voting against him they have silenced people who were preparing to charge them with blind narrowness. Sooner or later, however, opposition to suffrage will be almost everywhere regarded as a sign of mental unfitness for office. It will be as archaic as a belief in witchcraft. A candidate who opposes suffrage will be defeated not so much by the votes of women who go gunning for him as by the votes of everybody who believes that even a candidate for office ought to have a better brain than that.

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OF course the pacifists have something to gain by saying that it was their votes which gave suffrage to women in the state of New York. Of course the Socialists have something to gain by saying that their votes did it. Socialists and pacifists have the same thing to gain: a reputation for common sense. But why should anybody who is neither a pacifist nor a socialist try to give either or both of these groups the credit for the suffrage victory in New York? Be as conservative anti-suffrage as you please: that is your privilege. But don't let your conservatism keep you from seeing that a man who is a pacifist and a socialist and a suffragist might have been a suffragist without being either of the other ists. The great mass of women who wanted the vote were not actuated by any kind of ism. They wanted the vote because they wanted the vote. Most of the men who voted to let them have it did so because they thought the women ought to have it.

AUTHORITIES on transportation, whether conservative or radical, have long been agreed that the laws against combination work only mischief when applied to the railways. They have also been agreed that independent powers of regulation, federal and state, work only mischief. We do not need to prohibit railway combinations. Since we have full power to regulate rates, we can protect ourselves against the extortion that is the only injurious consequence of combination. The economies of combination may be ours without offsetting dangers. We do not need state supplementation of federal regulation. The federal government is hampered in its control of the railway service by an anachronistic and illogical dissection of that service into state and federal elements. Prejudices in favor of competition as a means of regulating railway rates, prejudices in favor of the retention of all the traditional field of state control, are unhappily not extinct. If we had remained at peace we might have waited patiently for such prejudices to die out, in a decade or two decades or more. With the country at war we cannot afford the delay. Transportation stands very high in the list of essential war services, and it is imperative to sweep aside the civil whims and prejudices that impair its efficiency. If there is reason to fear that the railways, pooled and operated as a unit, nationally controlled for the national good in war time, may represent in peace time an interest too vast to be kept subordinate to the government, we have an obvious remedy in railway nationalization.

IN accounting for his conduct and motives during the war Mr. Fritz Kreisler has done a service to the United States. Everyone agrees it is wrong to spend American dollars in a way that might aid the enemy, but while this motive may have governed a few of Mr. Kreisler's critics, most of them have yielded to the wholly vicious and malignant spirit that animates a mob, in its desire to injure a person supposedly weak. To understand how cruel this attitude actually has been, and to see how strong Mr. Kreisler's position is, it is enough to note these sentences in his candid explanation: "For fully three years my contributions were the sole and unique support of seventeen British, Russian, French and Italian artists and their entire families who found themselves stranded and utterly destitute in Austria at the outbreak of the war. . . . I have obeyed its [this country's] laws in letter and in spirit, and I have not done anything that might be construed in the least as detrimental to it. Not a penny of my earnings has ever, nor will it ever, contribute to the purchase of rifles and ammunition, no matter where and in whatsoever cause. The violent political issues over the world have not for an instant beclouded my fervent belief in true art as the dead center of all passions and strife, as the sublime God-inspired leveler of things, as the ultimate repacifier, rehumanizer, and rebuilder of destroyed bridges of understanding between nations." In dealing with military enemies it may be important to act first and investigate afterwards. In civil affairs it is panic, not patriotism, that says leap before you look. Mr. Kreisler's moving statement shows how base that panic is.

FEW members of the Republican party are better entitled to frame a new policy than the eminent and stalwart Senator Harding of Ohio. Well, he has enunciated a policy. Out of the large storehouse of statesmanship that is at the command of the regular Republican in this crisis he has produced the remarkable program that every soldier returning from the war should have a farm. There will be 2,000,000 returned soldiers, suggests Senator Harding: let there be 2,000,000 farms. Half a billion acres lie uncultivated or under-cultivated in these United States. Let us dispose these acres to the 2,000,000 gallant voters—or rather, soldiers—who will come back wishing nothing better than to turn their swords, if they had any, into plowshares. And the farmhouses on these farms? "The lumber of cantonments," says this resourceful Republican leader, "might be utilized in making soldier homes upon the land." Next to the famous plan by which every Negro was to have forty acres and a mule, this plan of Senator Harding's shows the finest political sagacity and liberality. And, if it comes to that, why can't he see to it that the 2,000,000 soldier-voters are pro-

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vided with 2,000,000 retired army mules? Surely Senator Harding can plan for mules.

HEARST'S International News Service warns us that we are to have war bread "with a twenty-five per cent increase in price and increase in the size of the loaf," "thirty per cent of its wheat of inferior quality." Only seventy per cent of the flour is to be from hard spring wheat; the rest is to be half soft winter wheat and half durum "(an inferior grade of Russian origin, but grown here)." This looks bad for the consumer of bread, does it not? So the International News Service intended it. But note that the size of loaf is to be increased; why did not the Hearst Service say that this increase is to be at least commensurate with the increase in price? Soft winter wheat looks discouraging; why did not the Hearst Service tell us that the best pastry flour in the world is made from it? Its gluten content is low for bread making. This defect is counterbalanced by the use of flour from durum wheat, which may be classed as "inferior" by American bakers, but makes a flour richer in gluten than any other. It is not of Russian origin, although some of our strains were introduced from Russia, where it is extensively grown to meet the south-European demand for macaroni flour. Mixed with other wheat, the durums of the Mediterranean basin give France the excellent bread that is fit to serve as a staff of life. So far then as concerns the formula reported by the International News Service, we are promised a bread better than that to which we have been accustomed.

MORE evidence that a national campaign for thrift should be launched is furnished by the rapid increase which there has lately been in Federal Reserve Bank investments. If the increase continues commodity prices will rise and the Reserve system be made a great engine of banking inflation. In Germany and France enormous inflation has been caused through government borrowing from the banks. Whether a similar inflation can be avoided in this country depends upon our ability to absorb such loans as the government may put out in excess of the current savings fund of the nation. That result can only be had by a thrift which does away with many small luxuries and even with some of those expenditures which are thought to be made for necessities. From the policy of business as usual with which many people urged us to begin the war we have shifted to the position that business must be especially directed if the war is to be won. With a new loan still some distance away it seems a good opportunity to urge national thrift as the next step in the acquisition of a financial policy which will be successful.

Leaving Policy to the Government

THE good American who at the present time begins the day by faithfully reading his daily journal will find in it either a speech by some public man or a leading article in the editorial columns made up of certain constant and familiar elements. There is generally an exordium upon the supreme necessity at this time of upholding the hands of the President. We must refrain from any discussion which could encourage the enemy, or create division in our own ranks, by suggesting inquiries, doubts or misgivings in the minds of our own people as to the objects of the war. "Now is not the time" for the consideration of peace terms; such, indeed, would come very near to sedition if not to treason. There usually follows a denunciation of all pacifists, who were recently described in an old and influential American monthly as "beetle-browed professors with dirty collars and broad minds, and unshaven and round-shouldered youths spitting forth great new ideas of the fusing of nations and the brotherhood of man . . . burdened with theories and ideals and obstinately blind to the facts of the sinful world." Such people, with their "poisonous doctrine of internationalism" (as one New York daily called it recently), would expose America to the fate of Belgium. Then follows some account of German treachery and atrocity, which is intended to lead all generous-minded folk to the conclusion that such dehumanized criminals as the German people must be killed off, if need be, to the last man. Just such a speech, beginning with a passionate denunciation of those who would embarrass the President by any discussion of peace terms at this moment, was made the other day by the president of one of America's greatest universities. It finished with the statement that the American who would listen to peace terms short of unconditional surrender of the German nation was a traitor to his country and to civilization.

Such speeches and articles have become the daily diet of our people. As wars have usually been managed, it is entirely natural that they should be. And it seems to occur neither to those who utter them nor to those who are undoubtedly very powerfully influenced by them, that in their effect on the present war they constitute a discussion of peace terms, and actually tend not to support the President in his policy, but ultimately to embarrass him.

Yet such is the case. They do constitute a discussion of peace terms in one of its most provocative forms, and the inevitable effect of their repetition will be to render the President's policy increasingly difficult of realization. This is their general effect, because they do not tell the whole truth, and

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those who might bring into relief the other no less essential part of the truth are terrorized into silence. The President's policy is leavened by two great principles, whose momentum in public opinion is checked by propaganda. One of those principles seeks to create a distinction between the German government and the German people by democratizing the latter, and seeks to remove the obstacles in the way of ultimate coöperation with them. The other principle is born of the absolute need of a radically different organization of the world in the future, an organization based on equality of treatment and opportunity for all nations. Such a policy will at best be most difficult to carry into effect. It will have to overcome not so much the express hostility of governments to its declared aims, as the profound skepticism of European diplomats who have lived their lives in an atmosphere of international rivalry, intrigue and animosities. The preoccupation of individual members of the Alliance with special national aims—an historical grievance to correct, a consanguineous population to redeem —will seem to them as war aims, as political realities, immeasurably more vivid and inspiring than any distant hope of the Society of Nations. Finally this policy will have to overcome the natural human anger toward an enemy we have been taught to hate, the natural hostility to a solution which would seem to exempt a criminal nation that has spread terror and calamity throughout the world from any appropriate retribution for its vast crime.

American liberals have hoped to oppose to these imponderable but immensely powerful forces the momentum of an internationalist faith that has not been broken by historical animosities and " particularist " ambitions. They have hoped to carry into the final Conference a statesmanship that has its face to the future rather than to the past. That hope will be vain if day by day, week by week, month by month, for the duration of the war, American public opinion ignores in practice the distinction which the President has made between the enemy peoples and governments; if it is encouraged to identify patriotism with a disparagement of the very internationalism for which the war is being fought. We shall then find at the period of the settlement that American opinion has lost its interest in the international aspect of democracy. The policy which the President has outlined will be condemned as a surrender to Germany, as a failure to do justice, to exact retribution for her colossal misdeeds. We shall be told that to grant to Germany economic opportunities equal with those of her victims is to connive at her escape from the costliest punishment the Allies are in a position to inflict; to encourage her to repeat her crimes and to supply her with the means of so doing. Any offer of disarmament or limitations will be received by the public with instinctive hostility and be condemned as an obvious trap. Any democratic reform within Germany itself will be disqualified as a trick of the German government. These are the feelings and the ideas with which American public opinion is now being infused, and which are gradually weaning Americans from their original pacifist preconceptions; and this propaganda, which may exert a profound influence on the ultimate settlement, is being masked as a patriotic refusal to embarrass the government with a discussion of peace terms during war.

No doubt the President when he seeks to make peace can, if necessary, challenge any public opinion which was hostile to the realization of his internationalist purposes; but, great as his prestige would be, his success would be doubtful. On the day when an armistice is declared, the President's war powers and war prestige will be very much diminished. Suppressed differences of opinion will be released and will be expressed with unmitigated violence. Much of the " patriotic " propaganda is being conducted by his enemies for the deliberate purpose of wrecking his plans and of preventing any settlement which will make for disarmament or international security and reconciliation. At a moment when he most needs the support of a nation whose purposes are clearly understood and sustained by a firm and self-possessed public opinion, his influence in Europe will be diminished by frank and vigorous opposition to his plans in America. It is by no means impossible that the real world settlement, the juncture which will call for America's final decision as to her future policy in Europe, will synchronize with the year of a Presidential election; and in that event any widespread public opinion hostile to the President would be deliberately " organized " and exploited by a Presidential rival honestly convinced, no doubt, that he was representing the real patriotism of the country. The President would find himself menaced with the withdrawal of the power which alone would enable him to impose from the top an ill-understood and inadequately popularized policy.

Beneath this attitude toward radical opinion in the war is a misreading of the underlying moral forces of organized society in the modern world. In every western nation there are large groups of people that will support a war—virtually any war —from motives which have been fostered by the European tradition of nationality, " my country, right or wrong," group loyalty, " herd instinct," animosity to rival nations or pugnacity. Appeals made to this order of motive arouse a quick and powerful reaction, just as in the eighteenth century " loyalty " was most easily visualized in a dynasty. But just as a century or more ago the old dynastic loyal-

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ties were being replaced by a body of ideas which gave us finally the principle of nationalities and popular rights, so to-day there is going on all over the western world a modification or development of the idea of nationality. The body of feeling and ideas which for so long made nationalism a living political religion is now with very many giving place to a new faith that makes for internationalism. The newer conception is less widespread than the old, but it is what the London Times truly calls it, a ferment; and to it probably belongs the future.

No sufficient effort has been made to win this body of opinion, which in foreign policy stands for internationalism, a world organization and disarmament, to the whole-hearted support of the war. All the governments have preferred to put the emphasis of their appeal upon the order of motives which are in effect an appeal to a group loyalty, to a somewhat narrow and exclusive nationalism, and to the animosities generated by the savagery of the enemy. But these appeals, notably the systematic exploitation of atrocities and the attempt to put unqualified responsibility for them upon the whole German people, do not suffice to justify a prolonged war to that type of mind in Europe to which the future belongs—the reformers, the "idealists"—those moved to build a new kind of world out of the ruins. They are not encouraged to support the war, because its constructive aims, in which they are particularly interested, have not been emphasized. They have often been ignored by the Allies in their relations one to another. Instead, governments have mainly depended upon repression, which has merely widened the gulf between the two bodies of opinion by making both more violent. Long years of Czarist repression did not destroy Socialism; it only made it a fruitful soil for Bolshevikism.

That discerning public opinion in foreign affairs which the President needs to sustain his policy when it is put to the final test would not involve at present a series of public discussions concerning intricate details of diplomacy and foreign affairs, such as the rival territorial claims in the Balkans. The American people cannot, nor will they ever wish to interfere in such decisions. The beneficial results of their intervention in a quarrel which is associated with so many European political interests will depend upon whether certain general principles are to be applied to its settlement. Shall the Allies at the close of the war assure the destruction of German militarism by detaching the German people from its support, by offering to a democratized Germany a security and an open field in the world, which will deprive it of any reason for rebuilding its military power? Whether that general policy is adopted or not will depend upon the public temper which prevails at the end of the war. If that temper is merely the development of the psychology now being nursed, such a policy will prove impossible, for the governments that sought to apply it with thoroughness would find themselves thwarted by violent opposition at home. It is in this way that in the last resort the success or failure of the aims for which America entered the war will depend upon "public opinion," and upon the influences which are brought to bear on public opinion now.

If the best of the American people decide to leave the consideration of war aims to the government, they will not leave it to the government. They will leave it to the most violent of the American junkers and chauvinists; and junker violence will provoke a counter violence on the part of an American Bolsheviki.

The question is, consequently, not whether the public could or should be encouraged to concern itself with the nature of our aims and of the settlement, but whether the discussion and consideration of those things, under the self-deceiving and illusory rule of silence, shall be one-sided, obscured and confused by emotion and passion and subject to irrational variations, or whether we shall attempt to preserve a clear-sighted and dependable public judgment—even more necessary in the deep and serious crises of war than in peace. Such public judgment can only be preserved by remaining faithful to the discipline which makes possible the patient consideration of conflicting views, the obligation to keep our tempers in the presence of contrary opinion, the self-control, which, as the President reminded us the other day, is one essential condition "of the thing we call democratic government."

Victory and War Aims

VICTORY; this is the one war aim of M. Clémenceau. In schemes of world organization after the war he has little faith. Distinguished men are at work on them, he observes, but men as distinguished have worked on similar schemes since time immemorial. For his own part, M. Clémenceau would refuse to enter a league of nations, including Germany, for has not Germany given proof that in her eyes there are no binding obligations? Thus along with the possibility of a league of nations to establish peace on firm foundations, M. Clémenceau dismisses the possibility of a change in the spirit of the German government that would make German engagements as good as those of other nations.

To beat Germany seems the sufficient and only plausible war aim to the military party everywhere. And there is this modicum of validity in the view: the defeat of Germany is an essential preliminary to the realization of any war aims whatsoever. The

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soldier as such has no concern with any other end than that of winning the war. And it is highly desirable that in this stage of the war the military object of beating Germany should be sharply distinguished from incidental political purposes. At the outset, the military object of inflicting final defeat upon Germany was too often complicated by the political object of occupying territory it was believed could be held after the war. By ancient tradition, possession counts heavily in determining whether certain territories shall be ceded or not. It is a tradition that we now discover has lost its validity. The main force of the Central Powers is grappling with the main force of the Allies on French and Belgian soil. Upon the outcome of the struggle depends the territorial dispositions to be made on the western and eastern fronts, on the Adriatic littoral and in the Balkans. In so far as the formula of victory brings about a recognition of this condition and a coördination of military activities appropriate to it, it is a rational and useful formula.

That, however, is all that can be said for it. It appears to be definite and unambiguous, but it is not. The Allies have already demonstrated that they have at their command a superiority in men, guns and machines. Since Verdun the Germans have steadily been pressed back. They have found that their defences are not impregnable, their armies not invincible. In the gigantic struggle they keep their feet, but they are breathing hard, and they will breathe harder. This is in itself defeat, but no one imagines it to be enough. It is not unlikely, indeed, it is highly probable, that in another twelve months they will be forced to retreat behind the line of the Meuse. This will be defeat, but will it be considered enough by those whose only war aim is victory? Hardly. At the end of two years of fighting it may be that the Germans will be pushed back to the Rhine. Will that suffice, or will it be necessary to go on to Berlin? There may be civilians who are sanguine enough to believe that the nations will endure the cost of a victory that involves the complete and unconditional surrender of all Germany. Military authorities subscribe to no such fancies.

Victory cannot be defined in terms that will make it a sufficient aim in a war like this. When the Germans have been beaten to the point of accepting such conditions as the Allies may reasonably impose, with a view to their own security and to the peace of the world, we shall have the only victory worth fighting for. Such victory is to be had only by the most thorough coördination of military forces, the most energetic application of all available resources to the business of war-making. But this is not enough. A deeper unity is required, a unity respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled before peace can be made.

The public has been warned by high official authority that there is no more pestilential delusion afloat than that the war is soon to end. The indications are, indeed, those of a long war. And in long wars the evolution of popular sentiment is unpredictable. The strain tells on even the firmest nation. If we are to have unity of morale among the nations opposing Germany, it must be made clear that the purposes for which we are fighting are absolutely harmonious, fully agreed upon and calculated to serve the interests of the world.

The need for unity of morale will become sufficiently clear if we look forward to the time when the pressure upon Germany becomes so severe that she will resort to "peace offensives" of a really dangerous character. Long before the Germans can be forced to the Rhine they will doubtless endeavor to split the Allied combination by offer of concessions to particular Powers. They may offer Alsace-Lorraine to France without compromising the offer with suggestions of compensating annexations at the expense of Russia. Such a concession might leave German autocracy and militarism practically unshaken; it might leave intact the menace of a developing Central European political system. Yet the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine—accompanied, of course, by the restoration of Belgium—would represent victory in tangible form to the French. They would fight on, to be sure, but their further sacrifices ought not to be for objects they had not accepted as essential. Or Germany might democratize her government, signify her readiness to disarm and associate herself with a league of nations. With what spirit would the United States then continue to send millions of men to fight in Europe?

If we are to have a unified war morale, we must have unity of war aims, and these in their broad principles must be known to the peoples as well as to the governments. The Germans refuse to formulate and publish their war aims. This is because they hope in one way or another to split the Allied group, to play the ambition of one Power against that of another. The position of the Allies is diametrically opposed to that of Germany. Their hope of making the most out of the war lies in their indivisibility. The formulation and publication of common aims is the best guaranty against the emergence of such a conflict of ambitions as Germany hopes to profit from.

Moreover, war aims in which the whole group of Allied nations can concur, and which may be published to the world cannot bear a selfishly nationalistic character. In the process of working out an agreement in war aims inordinate national ambitions would inevitably be pared down. In consequence, the conditions that Germany would

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be required to meet, however bitter to her governing classes, would not be such as permanently to prejudice the interests of the German people. It is not in the interest of the German people to hold alien populations under the dominion of German autocrats. It is not in their interest that Germany should remain a menace to the people of Europe. What the Allies would agree in demanding from Germany would represent nothing so extreme as to drive the German people to desperate resistance. An Allied program consisting simply of victory, undefined, is calculated to evoke in Germany the last extreme of resistance. A program consisting of definite, reasonable war aims will raise in Germany the question whether further fighting is worth while, long before the German power of resistance can be completely broken.

How Much Ought One to Contribute?

EVERYONE ought to contribute to the Liberty Loans in prospect. So much is clear. But what is not clear is just how much any particular person must contribute in order to feel that he has performed in full the obligation resting upon him. Recently a certain rich man, accused of lack of patriotism, set forth in the press, along with the statement that two of his sons are serving in the army, the statement that he had invested large sums in the Liberty Loan. It was good that he subscribed at all, but did he subscribe to the extent that his financial position really required? One man sells all his railway stocks and puts the proceeds into government loans. Another raises all the funds he can at the bank, using his corporation securities as collateral. Are these men pursuing policies that all patriotic citizens should emulate? These are specimens of the questions that arise in the minds of loyal Americans who recognize the vital importance to the nation of the successful flotation of its bond issues and are eager to do their part without flinching and would manage somehow to do it if it could be satisfactorily defined.

It would simplify matters to eliminate at the outset plausible, but delusive methods of meeting the obligation to contribute. One of these is the sale of permanent properties, tangible or intangible, to secure funds to invest in Liberty Loans. As matters stand, practically all available free capital is already pledged to war use. We are not extending our railways with a view to developments after the war. We are not launching new street railway enterprises, nor extending factories for the production of non-essentials, nor opening mines the products of which have no promise of immediate availability. Even if we were doing these things it would be the business of the government to stop such an unwarranted diversion of our resources. Since we are not diverting capital to such an extent as to demand governmental intervention, the individual is justified in regarding the existing stock of capital investments as something fixed, except for increases required by war. Accordingly, if he sells any part of his holdings, the price he takes for them is a part of the free fund of purchasing power that was at all events mortgaged to war uses. You sell $10,000 worth of land or buildings or stocks and put the proceeds into government loans. You have meant well. But you have made some one else put into land or buildings or stocks $10,000 that would have gone into government loans, or what is not less vital, munitions manufacture. You have cloaked yourself in patriotism, but have advanced your country's interest not at all.

But suppose that you had kept your original investments and had borrowed $10,000 at your bank to put into government loans. Here is new purchasing power, placed at the command of the government. So at any rate it appears. But let us look at the matter more closely. If the bank can safely let you have $10,000 on your note, it could more safely have let the government have the $10,000 on its note. Why does not the government raise its next five billions directly from the banks, any way? It does not want cash, but funds on which to draw in payment for supplies and labor, and it could secure these funds by discounting its own notes at the banks. So large a volume of credit might destroy the peace-time relation between deposits and reserves, but all the governments of Europe have waived their reserve requirements without apparent disaster. The truth is, the government wishes to avoid a credit inflation that would hoist all prices to the serious disturbance of civil relations and to the excessive aggravation of the cost of the war.

If the government hesitates to use its own credit, why should it welcome the use of the credit of the individual? There is indeed a desirable moral effect from the use of such credit. A loan oversubscribed, even by delusive methods, strengthens a tottering government. Our government stands unshakeable. Artificial bolstering of it is little short of ridiculous. If it needs bank credit for financing itself it can afford to use its own credit, instead of requisitioning that of private persons. The evil it wishes to avoid, inflation, is produced just as effectually by the use of individual credit as by that of government credit.

It is not upon one's possessions, then, nor upon one's credit that the obligation to contribute can rest, to the net public gain. It must therefore rest

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upon one's income. The fifteen billions, more or less, that will be required in the course of the next twelve months. will either be secured through savings out of income or through a credit inflation that in its immediate effects would amount to a universal tax on expenditure, through price inflation. How magnificently such inflation would work need not detain us here, since it must be clear to anyone who will reflect upon it.

Fifteen billions saved out of income would mean approximately one-third of the income of every person in the United States. But this does not adequately define the obligation of each. A quite special obligation evidently rests upon those whose incomes have been enlarged by the war. Excess profits and excess wages, taken together, can hardly amount to less than five billions. Except in so far as " excess wages " are necessary for full efficiency and excess profits for new equipment, all of this war income should plainly be placed at the disposition of the government. And in addition, all increases in income due to the regular course of business progress or promotion in salary ought to be applied in the same way. We lived somehow on the smaller incomes of a year ago. We felt the need of a higher standard of comfort, no doubt, but this is no time to be over-indulgent to ourselves. While our soldiers are preparing to make the extreme sacrifice, if necessary, we civilians can at least forego our aspirations to live more comfortably.

If we were all rigorously to exclude an advance in standards made possible by increasing incomes, the nation would quite certainly command over five billions from this source. It would remain to distribute ten billions more over the forty billions of income that represent the normal flow. Of this aggregate a good third consists of extremely small incomes, one thousand dollars or less, from which no considerable savings are to be expected. It is a necessity of war that the working man and his family should be fed and clothed and housed as well or better than in time of peace, and this requirement must necessarily absorb most of the small incomes in question. Those with small incomes who have less than the usual private obligations to support, single men and women, childless pairs, families all of whose members are breadwinners, have a modest contributing power that for the class as a whole might easily aggregate a billion or more.

Another third of our normal income falls in sums ranging between $1,000 and $2,000. Here again the contributing power must not be exaggerated. Almost all can contribute something, and those with light burdens can contribute materially. We may put the aggregate at two billions, or a little less than one-sixth of the income of the whole class.

Assuming, then, that excess incomes are consigned to war use, that incomes of $1,000 and less yield one billion and those of $1,000 to $2,000 yield two billions, there would remain seven billions to be raised by our more fortunate classes, those enjoying normal incomes of $2,000 and upward. This would mean, on the average, about one-half of such incomes. The sacrifice would manifestly be too heavy for those at the lower limit; the obligation must therefore be graded, the larger incomes yielding much more than half.

How, then, is any particular individual to determine his patriotic obligation to contribute? In the first place he will fix his attention upon his income. He cannot serve by manipulating his capital or his credit. In the second place he will recognize that the obligation rests with special weight upon any increase of income due to the war, or even coincident with it. In the third place he will take account of the fact that the obligation is progressive. The larger his income the greater the proportion he is under obligation to contribute. And finally he will have regard to the relative weight of personal obligations resting upon him. From a weighing of all these considerations, it is admitted, nothing like a perfect definition of the obligation can be derived. You can not say, when you have resolved to save two hundred for Liberty Loans, that you have fully met your obligation. You may have done better than A or B, but it is the part of the good patriot to assume a share of the burden thrust aside by the slackers. Moreover, it is inevitable to err; but in this case it is incumbent upon the patriot to err on the side of excess. And that patriotism may not be too heavily penalized, he who sacrifices to excess in the present is certain of a corresponding reward in the future, when four per cent government bonds can no longer be had for the asking, but only on payment of a substantial premium.

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"Expedition" for Ships

WHAT is the most preposterous fact in the United States? There might be many candidates for this position. For instance, certain high chiefs in the Army Department, who proved themselves utterly inadequate and ineffective in our war against Villa, are still in high offices in Washington conducting a war against Hindenburg and Ludendorff. This is a strong fact, which might enlist many votes.

Another strong one is that employers exist who are quite willing to face a strike among their employees on war work, rather than recognize their employees' elected representatives. Such employers exist. They would rather see war work interrupted than surrender their privilege of being the fount of justice, the personal fount of personal justice, in their industry. If any one of their subjects has a grievance, let him approach their persons personally and he shall have justice forthwith. What is the need of elected representatives? In fact, one of the exquisite punishments we propose to inflict upon the Kaiser, in order to ruin Germany, is that he shall be obliged to listen to elected representatives. Certain such employers refused, in a recent strike on the Atlantic Coast, to enter the same room and even, afterwards, to sign the same piece of paper with the leaders of the trade unions. The leaders of the trade unions signed one piece of paper, the employers another. A strong fact, that, with a flourish of humor even stronger. Many people might give it their votes.

For myself I choose the fact to which this article is respectfully dedicated, a fact unfortunately quite destitute of humor—namely:

We are likely to have fewer new merchant ships on January 1st than if we had never created the Emergency Fleet Corporation. We created it to get new ships, to expedite new ships. We are now likely to have fewer of them on January 1st than if we had never created it at all. Our yards might well have produced more ships by January 1st if the Emergency Fleet Corporation had never been brought into existence.

To understand how this fact can be, one must reflect on the condition in which our yards found themselves at the time when the Emergency Fleet Corporation was created. They were full of work, of useful work, useful for the war. Some of them were what we may call "old" yards. That is, they antedated the outbreak of the European war. They totaled, the really important ones among them, perhaps twelve or fifteen. They were, and are, the core of the shipbuilding industry of America, radiating experience and losing skilled men continuously to their newer competitors. Then there were the yards which we may call, without offense, the "boom" yards. They were built to meet the new clamor for quick new ships caused by submarine sinkings and by other new states of things. Whether "old" or "boom," these yards, all of them, in building ships for private parties for ocean voyages were building ships, in effect, for the war. In them the Emergency Fleet Corporation found 403 ships, attractive to it, on August 3rd. Each one of these ships was of at least 2,500 tons dead-weight—a decent size. Each one of them, whether on the ways or not, was far enough along in "preparation" to be regarded by the Emergency Fleet Corporation as being "under construction." Together they composed a fleet of 2,800,000 tons dead-weight—an immense fleet—equal to the whole of the then existing effective ocean-going merchant fleet of the United States.

Manifestly these ships were our hope for this winter. These yards were our real great expectations. As for the subsequent yards, built expressly to fill contracts for the Emergency Fleet Corporation itself, yards which they call "emergency" yards, we could not really imagine that they would give us any great additional vigor for next spring's campaign. Their average condition now is not unfaithfully represented by the condition of the yard of the Los Angeles Shipbuilding Company. This company was among the first companies to get an Emergency Fleet Corporation contract for new ships. Last month it was able to announce to the trade papers that it had reclaimed thirty acres of submerged land for its yard and had erected twelve buildings on that land and had got two ships to the stage of keel-laying. These ships have little to say to January 1st. As for the wooden ships, they too, have little to say to January 1st; and, for that matter, they have little to say to March 1st. Finally, as for the "fabricated" ships, the steel "fabricated" ships, which constitute our supreme prospective "quantity production" of ships, to be achieved in those three, new, great, wonderfully great, yards at Newark in New Jersey and at Hog Island and at Bristol in Pennsylvania, we may safely say that if any one of them gets to Europe in 1918, and we hope that many of them may, it will be to give sustenance to Europe and to our army in Europe for the fall and winter of 1918-1919.

Therefore our most instant task was in our existing yards, "old" and "boom." It was in the ships commandeered on August 3rd. Those ships

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were our genuine new fleet, for this winter and for next summer. Instead of being expedited, they have been, on the whole, retarded.

This fact is not unsuspected by the members of the Shipping Board. Indeed, it must have been their conviction of it, along with their conviction of other similar facts, that fortified them, and justified them, in their recent reorganization of the Emergency Fleet Corporation and of that Corporation's personnel. Mr. Hurley here deserves, as few people in Washington have deserved, the thanks of his countrymen. The retardation of prospective ships for this war was due to the policy of certain persons highly placed in the Emergency Fleet Corporation. They were honest persons, patriotic persons, highly intelligent persons, technically, but retarding persons. Mr. Hurley has eliminated them, or, at any rate, at present writing, has eliminated their power. It doubtless gave him pain, and, in this Washington of ours, it required a courage appalling. It puts Mr. Hurley at a unique level among our public men. He is the first department head at Washington actually to eliminate highly placed persons whose continuance in office has come to be an impediment to the conduct of the war.

To do it he must have been obliged to revise the by-laws of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. To revise those by-laws he must have been obliged to get the coöperation of the trustees of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, meaning the members of the Shipping Board. Clearly, he got it. Therefore they share the credit of this occasion with Mr. Hurley. They are Washington's first Lord High Executioners in this war. Other department heads will presently develop into Lord High Executioners or else ascend the scaffold themselves. They will have their choice between those two rôles. The members of the Shipping Board have chosen and, in choosing, they have deserved well of the Republic.

Further, we may now congratulate ourselves on the fact that responsibility for new ships is at last located on one man's shoulders. Mr. Hurley, besides being president nominally of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, is now president really. If we get a new fleet, it is his making. If we do not get a new fleet, it is his unmaking. It is one man's making or unmaking. So should it be, surely, with every specific task. For the whole war we need, along with the President, always supreme, always an autocrat, utterly so, a council, a reporting and executing council, on policy. For each specific task we need a man, one man. Mr. Hurley, in the case of ships, with a Lloyd George courage, has made himself that man. And Mr. Wilson must have allowed him. So to both of them the most earnest thanks so far earned. Now the old policy toward our "commandeered" ships can be revised. Inevitably, in spirit at least, it is bound to be revised. And what was it?

The only sure way to understand it, after all, is to put one's self in the place of the shipbuilder. I have certain ships on my ways. I am building them for private parties, American and foreign. The contracts for some of them were made some time back. This is particularly likely to be the case if my yard is an "old" yard, an experienced and highly skilful yard, a yard therefore especially useful to the United States. In certain cases these contracts have now become distinctly unprofitable. They name a fixed price which is considerably lower than the present cost of construction. Cost has gone up. I see that I am about to lose money, lots of it, on these contracts. And shipbuilding has been a lean industry in this country. I am in no position to lose lots of money. I therefore go to the private parties concerned and seek a re-adjustment. They are quite willing to confer. They want those ships. They want them just as soon as possible. Every month of delay, every month spent in the yard instead of on the ocean, means for those private parties the loss of a small fortune in ocean-freight-rates. They are keen to confer.

But I get a telegram from Admiral Capps. August 3rd has arrived. All the ships in my yard are "commandeered." I must confer with my private parties no longer. And I must take no more money from them. Their payments to me, on work being done, cease. The Emergency Fleet Corporation steps into their shoes. It owns their contracts. Whatever readjustments I want I must get from Admiral Capps. I proceed to Admiral Capps. I tell him, I prove to him, that I am going to lose money on these ships. He is not alarmed. The private parties were. They wanted tonnage. Admiral Capps wants law. His decision, in sum, is: "You say that you cannot build these ships and come out even on them. You say that you will lose heavily on them. Granted. But what is that to me? You have made bad contracts. Fill them. And fill them fast. *Expedite* them."

Expedite them? What does that mean? It means, above everything else, the taking on of new men. And that means, today, the taking on of green men. I am to take on a horde of green men. I am to dilute my good labor with poor labor. I am to reduce the efficiency of my yard. Every unit of work turned out will cost me more. On every ship on which I was going to lose money, I shall lose more money. The faster I work, the more I shall lose. If I could conceivably turn out all those low-price ships in one day, I should be bankrupt in the evening. Expediting means, and must mean, spending money. It means, and must mean, increas-

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ing cost. Admiral Capps is not content with giving me a loss on certain ships. He wants to give me an expedited loss. I begin to have a sudden admiration and affection for Josephus Daniels.

Josephus Daniels is placing contracts for warships at cost plus ten per cent. He has never been suspected of any irrepressible passion for enriching armor-plate makers or coal operators or shipbuilders or any other class of purveyors to the government. And cost-plus-ten is no bonanza. But I ask nothing better. If on all my contracts for private parties, Admiral Capps would treat me as Josephus Daniels treats the shipbuilders who are lucky enough to have contracts for those new destroyers, I should go ahead, full-steam, perfectly contented. But he will not do it. He will not do anything like it. Instead, from persons highly placed in the Emergency Fleet Corporation, I begin to get lectures on patriotism. They have the same effect on me that such lectures have on a blacksmith or on a boilermaker who thinks that he is not getting, in money, a square deal. If I have any sense at all, I begin to see what those lectures must do to him. They sicken me. I ask for equity and I get the Stars and Stripes.

So what do I do? I put on new men, yes, some, in fact a good many. But I still work only one shift. I still work only eight hours out of the twenty-four. I do not let loose, really. I cannot. It would be too risky, financially. I have to borrow money to meet my current obligations. I have to borrow too much money. And if I get into a tight place, I know perfectly well that Admiral Capps will never help me out. *And he is now my only customer.* I go ahead; but I go ahead, as the locomotive engineers say, "under control." Genuine full-steam expedition has not happened. It would have been to the financial advantage of those private parties of mine to purchase full-steam expedition. It is not being purchased now. Therefore, relatively, there is retardation. And meanwhile the Emergency Fleet Corporation goes and does two new things which retard me still more.

The first of these things is that the Emergency Fleet Corporation places contracts for new ships of its own, and for new yards for new ships, in my neighborhood. It must. It should. I do not complain of that placing, in itself. But it proceeds to compete with me for my employees. I have already lost many men, skilled men, high and low, to the "boom" yards. I now begin to lose men to the government itself, to the Emergency Fleet Corporation's contractors and agents. Every such loss means for me a decrease in efficiency, a decrease in speed. I find myself slowed down by the very organization, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which is urging me to speed up. As a customer, it wants speed, though it refuses to pay for it. As a competitor, it steals from me my means of speed.

Thereupon I raise wages. Everybody raises wages. And the government appoints a wages board. It is based on an agreement between the government and certain trade unions. If I am a reasonably enlightened shipbuilder, I do not object to a wages board. But its decisions, advancing wages in the shipbuilding industry, are, after all, acts of the government, just as the "emergency" yards for "emergency" ships, creating a new competition and so likewise advancing wages, are also, after all, acts of the government. But does the government assume the burden of the consequences of those acts? I hasten to Washington and I find that it does not, in any such way as will fit my case. I find myself flat against the second new thing done by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

This second thing is that it has decided that on my contracts on my "commandeered" ships I must stand all the cost of increased wages myself. I had counted on profits on certain of my ships. Now the government, by greatly increasing the cost of labor, has forced me into greatly increasing the cost of those ships; and yet it tells me that this greatly increased cost, due to its own acts, is for me to meet. I argue, with some vehemence. The utmost concession I get is that if my ultimate profits should fall below a ten per-cent level, then, and then only, the government will assume one-half of each new wage-advance authorized. One-half! Where am I now? My low-fixed-price contracts, my unprofitable contracts, I must finish unprofitably. And on my other contracts, in total, I am driven to the prospect of a profit less than the minimum fixed on navy contracts by Josephus Daniels himself.

In these circumstances, facing a sure loss on certain ships, facing the possibility of a most inadequate return on other ships, losing men and skill daily to Admiral Capps's own enterprises, and seeing all these things combine to make a future utterly uncertain, I am not equipped, and, above all, I am not heartened, to undertake the thoroughly reckless damn-the-expense expedition which is the only sort of expedition that can give us our maximum answer to the submarine. At the end of three and a half months of a "commandeered" career, in which I was to have the backing of a great government, I find myself, along with the mass of the "old" yards, the best yards, actually, on the average, less expedited, less expanded, on my existing contracts than I might easily have been if, under simple governmental encouragement, without any governmental "commandeering" at all, I had been left alone with my private parties to get them to pay an increased private bill for increased private profitable speed.

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Such is the record. I do not know what Mr. Hurley intends to do to change it. But it is clear that he intends to change it somehow. And there are only two thinkable methods. Take over the ship-building industry entirely, appropriate it, operate it. Or else give it, in private hands, an assured financial prospect on every ship, on every job, everywhere. Let us have the merits either of fearless public enterprise or of fearless private enterprise. To date, since August 3rd, in the yards which are the core of our shipbuilding business, we have had a sticky mingling of public pedantry and of private uncertainty and timorousness. There could hardly be a surer recipe for retardation. It is Mr. Hurley's tremendous task precisely to reverse it.

WILLIAM HARD.

British Labor in the Ascendant

IT will not be surprising if October, 1917, is noted in future calendars of the British labor movement as marking the first move in that bloodless revolution which Mr. J. H. Thomas, the railway-men's secretary, recently predicted. In that month two steps were taken—the adoption by the executive of the Labor party of a new party constitution, and the decision of a representative congress of coöperative societies to throw the whole of their great movement into the political field—that promise to change fundamentally the balance of political parties in Great Britain.

To appreciate the significance of those decisions it is necessary to compare the position of British labor three months ago with its position today. Down to August of this year all who believed in the need for a well established Labor party in Great Britain were uniformly pessimistic. The effect of the war on democracy was that Labor had almost ceased to count as a political force. On its industrial side it was always formidable, for the risk of a strike of engineers or miners was a danger no government could lightly incur. But as an organized political party resting its power on its command of the electorate the Labor movement by the end of the third year of the war had fallen on evil days. One school of Labor members in the House of Commons was under ban as pacifist, another as being mortgaged to the government. Whatever industrial unrest there was found new mouthpieces among the rank and file in the workshops, ignoring alike the titular trade union leaders and the political representatives of Labor in Parliament. The influence of the old Labor organizations was waning, and new associations, suspiciously fertilized by plutocratic patronage, were springing up in rivalry.

That was the position in August, when the discussions on British representation at the Stockholm Conference supervened to intensify existing controversies. Labor was known to be divided on the question, and every hostile critic—among them five-sixths of the London press—predicted a radical and lasting cleavage. There seemed ample foundation for the forecast. By all the omens Stockholm should have meant a split. In the event it has proved the starting point of an irresistible movement towards consolidation. The explanation of that dramatic change is not obscure. The danger of disintegration had become so grave that the choice lay naked and open between solidarity and impotence. With that knowledge weighing daily more heavily on the mind of Labor, a sudden political sensation resolved all doubts and hesitations. Mr. Arthur Henderson, the secretary and recognized leader of the Labor party, having found himself at cross purposes with his colleagues of the War Cabinet, severed his association with them under circumstances succinctly characterized in the terse declaration of Mr. Robert Smillie, the miners' leader, that "Henderson didn't resign; Henderson was chucked." There was sufficient truth in that interpretation of the facts to sting Labor into action. It saw or imagined a challenge and took it up forthwith. Unwittingly enough, Mr. Lloyd George had galvanized the Labor movement into new life.

The Stockholm question forthwith assumed a different color. It was affected not so much by the personal issue involved in the Prime Minister's treatment of Mr. Henderson as by the instinctive reaction against the provocation conceived to have been offered to Labor as a whole. The government's refusal of passports, for example, was denounced as emphatically by Labor leaders opposed to the Stockholm conference as by its most convinced supporters, and at a national Labor congress the proposal to send delegates to Stockholm was carried by a sweeping majority. It is true that at a subsequent congress ten days later that decision was only reaffirmed by the narrowest of margins, but the turnover of votes, due to an apparent change of front by the 600,000 miners, was the result of the miners' disapproval not of the Stockholm project itself but of the composition of the proposed British delegation. None the less the contrast between the two votes was striking. If the critics were to be believed it marked the total

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discomfiture of Labor, for though the earlier Stockholm decision was in fact endorsed it was by so narrow a margin that there was no prospect whatever of the issue of the necessary passports.

To all appearance those criticisms were fully justified. The crisis in the affairs of Labor had reached a head. The annual Trade Union Congress, representing the industrial side of the movement, was to be held just three weeks later. At that congress, it was confidently predicted, the Stockholm proposals would be finally damned. And since Stockholm had by this time come to bulk more largely as a symbol in the domestic controversies of Labor than as an objective actuality an adverse vote by the Trade Union Congress would have had devastating effects on the doubtful solidarity of the Labor movement. But no such adverse vote was recorded. A skilfully framed compromise motion, declaring for the holding of an international Socialist conference after due preparation in the different countries, was carried by an overwhelming majority, and Mr. Henderson, attending as a fraternal delegate from the Labor party, met with an ovation that set his own position out of reach of envy, detraction or malice. That was the first of three notable events which have changed the whole face of the Labor movement. The others, the framing of the Labor party's new constitution and the entry of the coöperative movement into politics, have already been mentioned and may now be more fully discussed.

The realized achievements and the still greater potentialities of the coöperative movement are imperfectly appreciated even in Great Britain. Over large areas in the industrial districts the movement is an integral part of the life of the working classes. The retail coöperative societies have a membership of between three and four millions, and thus claim to supply (since each member represents a family) something like a third of the whole population. Their trade over the counter in 1915 reached a total of £106,000,000, the Coöperative Wholesale Society doing business to the amount of £57,000,000 in the same year. The whole of the profits of the societies, after the payment of a moderate interest on a moderate capital, goes back to the consumer in quarterly dividends varying from five per cent to twelve and one-half per cent on the amount of his purchases. The movement is not entirely a commercial enterprise, since every retail society sets apart a percentage of its profits for educational and other constructive work. But hitherto it has steadfastly eschewed political activity. Its members could hold what views they would and advocate them as they would. That remains theoretically true today, for the vote of the recent conference was merely in favor of running coöperative candidates for the House of Commons. No stipulation is laid down as to party color, but no one doubts that nine coöperative candidates out of every ten will stand virtually on a Labor platform. The two bodies will work separately, but in harmony. Where there is a coöperative candidate, he will get the Labor vote. Where a Labor man is standing, the local coöperators will back him. That, of course, is no radically new development. It is probably true already that most cooperators are associated with the Labor party or the Trade Union Congress or both. But many hundreds of thousands are not. It is the political influence of these hundreds of thousands that will be mobilized by the recent decision, while the rest will now be bound to the Labor movement by a triple tie instead of a single or a double.

Significant as the coöperators' new departure is, it yields place in importance to the simultaneous self-reformation of the Labor party. In the past that party has been a close corporation. In the future its doors will be open to all, whether brain workers or manual workers, who avow sympathy with its declared objects. Hitherto it has been a federation of trade unions and three small Socialist societies. Any would-be member of the party had to gain entrance to it through a union of one of the three societies. (There was indeed one class of exceptions to that rule, but it was so small as to be negligible.) Henceforward there will be organized branches of the party in every Parliamentary constituency, and every branch will accept individual members, whether they are connected with a trade union or Socialist society or not. The appeal of the party is to be specifically to "workers with hand or brain," and the writer, the thinker, the lawyer, the doctor, the schoolmaster, the engineer, to whom the stated objects of the party commend themselves, will be welcomed into full cooperation and alliance, with rights of direct representation on the central executive. At the same time, women, who under the Representation of the People bill, now before Parliament, will form more than a third of the electorate, are to have the same place and power as men in the counsels of the party.

That is not the only change the new constitution has inaugurated, but it is by far the most important at a time when a new grouping of political parties in Great Britain is in visible progress. Today all the old parties are in the melting-pot. The Conservatives are being weakened by the secession of a number of their second and third rank members, who are enrolling themselves under the colors of a new "National Party" aiming, with a great deal of sound and heat, at nothing in particular. The Irish are certain under any conceivable Home Rule

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settlement to find their numbers in the House of Commons greatly reduced. Liberalism is in complete disintegration. The right wing of the party has thrown itself into full coöperation with the Coalition government. The Center gives the government uneasy and unenthusiastic support on patriotic grounds. The Left, which is much more influential outside the House of Commons than in it, is openly ready to break with the party tradition and strike an alliance, if an alliance on reasonable terms is offered, with the independent and iconoclastic forces of Labor.

Such an alliance opens up great political possibilities, and there is little doubt that the new "individual membership" provisions in the Labor party constitution will be a bridge over which a substantial block of the Liberal left will pass into the Labor camp. That process has palpable dangers. Labor will tolerate no dominance by intellectuals, and the intellectuals will not submit to bondage to a stereotyped and perhaps doctrinaire program. But those dangers can and must be avoided. Labor has great need of the brain workers, and the infusion of a progressive Liberal-Radical element will give the party a new strength and balance. As things stand today the prospects of Labor are demonstrably more hopeful than those of either the Liberal or Conservative parties. That of course is spoken relatively. A Labor majority in the House of Commons is still far beyond the horizon. But as a political group Labor in the House seems certain to be greatly strengthened. At the 1906 election Labor fought fifty seats and won twenty-nine. In January, 1910, it fought seventy-eight and won forty. In December, 1910, the last general election, it fought fifty-six and won forty-two. The intention now is to put no fewer than three hundred candidates in the field, and, given the harmonious alliance that is promised between all sections of the new Labor movement, it is not putting it too high to estimate that at least half that number should be returned.

Much in any case has been achieved already. The past three months have seen the democratic forces in Great Britain both coördinated and consolidated. The one process has implied the other. The Trade Union Congress, the Labor party and the Coöperative Union are recognized as the undisputed representatives of democracy in its different aspects as they have never been before. Their spheres are defined and their relations are straightforward and friendly. The Trade Union Congress represents the worker as producer, the Labor party the worker as voter and legislator, the Coöperative movement the worker as consumer. The broad policy of each association—housing, educational and social reform, effective Parliamentary control of foreign policy, state ownership of the main instruments of production and transport, increased control by the workers of the processes of industry—is substantially the same, and the three bodies will become increasingly identified through their individual members. At the last Trade Union Congress the watchword "Every trade unionist a coöperator and every coöperator a trade unionist" found wide support. The formula, to fit the present need, must be widened to include the political expression of Labor activity. That would mean that every manual worker, and most of the so-termed brain workers, would individually be a member at once of a trade union, a coöperative society and a local Labor party branch. That point has not yet been reached, but the ideal is coming rapidly within reach of realization. The mere process of realizing it may have a transforming effect on British politics.

H. Wilson Harris.

London.

Henry James's Workshop

WHEN Henry James died he left two novels unfinished, The Ivory Tower and The Sense of the Past. These have just been published by the Messrs. Scribner, with prefaces by Percy Lubbock, who tells just what one wants to know. "It was Henry James's constant practice, before beginning a novel," Mr. Lubbock says, "to test and explore in a written or dictated sketch . . . the possibilities of the idea which he had in mind. Such a sketch was in no way a first draft of the novel. He used it simply as a means of close approach to his subject, in order that he might completely possess himself of it in all its bearings." Two of these sketches, the only two still in existence, are republished as notes to the unfinished novels. They show Henry James groping and deducing his way through his subject, starting questions and pressing for answers, seeking, finding, testing, rejecting. Not since 1909, when Ibsen's preliminary studies made their appearance, has any book thrown such interesting light on the literary process.

The notes do not tell us, to be sure, how Henry James got the situation, or the donnée, to keep his own word for it, from which he deduced the rest of a novel, but they tell us nearly everything else. We find him quite aware of the extent to which his men and women were exceptional. "There's no doubt about it," he says, "I am rather as usual, offering a group of the personally remarkable, in a high degree, all round." He says again, of his hero in The Ivory Tower: "A very special case

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indeed *is* of course our Young Man, without which my donnée wouldn't come off at all." He wishes to represent as "conceivable and clear, or in other words credible, consistent, vivid and interesting, the particular extraordinary relation thus constituted." His aim, though he doesn't quite say so, is to make us believe in "conditions too exquisite to be believed."

In The Sense of the Past he is trying, among other things, for "just one of those effects of underlying distress, of sense of danger, as I comprehensively call it, which are of the very finest essence of one's general intention." In The Ivory Tower he is trying for "the sense of the shade of perfidy, treachery." One thinks of the later novels, of how perfidy counts, counting for beauty too, in the human relations explored and exhibited in The Wings of the Dove and The Golden Bowl.

How did Henry James set about imagining his human relations, always between remarkable persons, always extraordinary, exquisite if possible? The notes show us how important for his creative process was what he calls logic. He always has his eye on logic. "The logic, the exquisite of this, to be kept tight hold of"—"here the very finest and closest logic must govern all one's sequences"—"of course, the absence of fear on her part has to be *based*, has to have its own logic in order to have all its beauty." Does not this care for logic help us to see why his characters often appear too exposed, as if things which nature would have left in the subconsciousness had moved up above the threshold?

Repeatedly in these notes, when speaking of the effort he must make, he uses the words "pressure" and "press." They are revealing words. When Henry James was writing a novel he pressed every one of the moments he was imagining, hoping thus to force each to yield the last drop of its special virtue. When we read one of his later novels his men and women seem to repeat this performance. Through their uninterrupted pressure the motive force of the novel, the force that keeps it going, is applied.

It is curiosity, of course, which leads his characters to keep the pressure up. Henry James appears more aware, in these notes, of what curiosity did for him than of the price he paid for its help. He speaks of the "intense curiosity" of a minor character as "what we sufficiently know him by and what he is for the time identified by." Something in The Ivory Tower is to affect Cissie Foy "with but a finer yearningness of interest." By dowering nearly all his characters with curiosity, with interest in his donnée, he makes nearly all of them functional, organizes his novel, achieves unity. The price he pays is one sort of likeness to life. Almost every case of curiosity is accounted for, but not even Henry James's logic can render such a throng of curiosities lifelike by merely accounting for each.

And while we read we are sometimes thankful that we live among less vigilant persons, in a real world where even our most assiduous friends have time and attention for their own affairs. Logic was Henry James's overvalued precaution against an air of unreality in his imagined world. What other precautions he took the notes do not tell us. They do testify, however, to his general concern for reality. "I don't want anything pretty or conventionally 'pleasing,'" he says when choosing names for his characters, "everything of the shade of the real." In another context he refers to "the fact that my whole action does, can only, take place in the air of the last actuality." Which might prompt one to say, adapting a passage from one of his short stories: "He exquisitely respected reality. It did not matter. The reality was all his own." But this reality of his own, which he obviously did not care to seek by imitating any of life's surfaces, what was it? The notes tell us. Seeing him at work we partly see and partly guess how he strove, how unsparingly he did his utmost, to arrive in the case of every imagined personality, and of every relation between persons, at flawless logical coherence. Like every novelist, he had to sacrifice other kinds of reality to the kind he preferred.

Later steps in his process, when he was nearing actual presentation of his hard-won material, are almost as fully illustrated by these notes. Each relation between persons is to be exhibited with the last thoroughness, and each exhibition must follow what Henry James calls his law of successive aspects, viewed each from its own centre. When two persons spend an inquisitive hour together we must never learn more than the sum of their discoveries. Something is always saved and withheld, to be used later. "The very law of my procedure here," he says, "is to show what is passing in his excellency's mind only through Ralph's detection and determination, Ralph's own expression of it—so leaving my own exhibition of it to stand over for my final chapter." Well, does not every novelist save for his last chapter, if he know his business? True, but Henry James's preoccupation with saving shows often, I think, in his finished work, on many an occasion when we wonder why an artist who had so much to give should impress us chiefly as anxious to withhold and retard.

He could not very well help knowing that he had much to give, and he was not always reassured by this knowledge. "I positively quake," he confesses, thinking of the possibilities of his drama,

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" in dread of the muchness with which they threaten me." " There's a great lot in it," he says again, "—only too much, alas, given my faculty for amplifying and going far." But in his fears there is also a confident joy: " And I seem to see already how my action, however tightly packed down, will strain my Ten Books, most blessedly, to cracking. That is exactly what I want, the tight packing *and* the beautifully audible cracking; the most magnificent masterly little vivid economy, with a beauty of its own equal to the beauty of the donnée itself, that ever was."

Economy, closeness, what hindered him from obtaining them? He realized their value, he was all for keeping " a rigorous tight hand on the excess." The notes do not reveal the deeper cause of his failures. They merely lay bare one of many causes. Henry James was overfond of " the scenic." Not but what he was on his guard against its abuse: " The present is of course a much larger and more complicated affair [than The Turn of the Screw], lending itself much more to the scenic, even in a manner insisting on it a little, or a good bit; but I must guard, guard and all the while intensely guard, myself, none the less—or I shall sprawl out over ever so much more ground than I shall want, or at all need, for my best effect, to cover. If I may but look it well in the face that the thing can only afford in a very minor degree, not in the least in a preponderant one, to express itself scenically . . . " But in spite of his resistances the passion too often ruled him. What he tries for, whenever he does " hand my subject over to the scenic," is to put his readers into the position of a man looking at and listening to a scene. The achieved effect is frequently not this. For my part, when Henry James is describing the motions of his characters, is telling us how they sit down, stand up, light cigarettes and throw them away, I often feel as if I were indeed in a theatre, but a theatre whose manager had ordered his actors to pause between speeches, so that he might read the stage directions aloud.

The interest of the notes can only be indicated, vaguely and inadequately, in this review. They ought to be read by everybody who is curious about the art of novel writing. Their light plays over the creative imagination at work. And they form, as a whole, an instructive picture. One sees a procession. Henry James leads it, pressing tirelessly toward his goal, which is always a strange unsimple beauty of relation between remarkable persons. Next come these persons themselves, who have oddly the air of being conducted by Henry James on the same quest as his. Looking neither to right nor left they follow precisely where he leads. The procession is closed by Henry James's readers, destined to be as richly rewarded as their predecessors, but a shade less eager, not quite so tireless.

Q. K.

Political Revolt in the Northwest

IV. Where the Farmers Are Heading

LOCALIZATION in North Dakota is not the aim of the Nonpartisan League. In the one year in which the farmers' organization has had control of that State a number of progressive laws have been passed, and a beginning has been made at raising the standards of the rural schools. As the League goes on to work out the balance of its program it also turns to new fields. A national headquarters has been established in St. Paul. Organizers are at work in ten western states, reaching from Wisconsin to the Coast. The League is now aiming at a general interstate movement that will have the advantages of unity, and be given its first test in the next elections.

In a great measure, of course, any success of its plans depends upon the ability of the League to follow its first campaigns with an effective method of keeping its membership solidified. The record of earlier " farmers' movements " shows how successfully intrigue from within can bring about disruption. One precautionary step which the League has taken is to limit membership exclusively to farmers, and in this way to minimize the chances for divergent aims to arise. It has also ruled that there shall be no local activity below the state organization. When the unit is the county or the township, the dam across someone's creek or the trespassing of someone else's cattle is ever likely to become the dominant issue. Farmers' organizations frequently disintegrate because a local quarrel supplants the broader purposes for which the union was joined. For the present, at least, that fate will not overtake the Nonpartisan League.

But there is also necessary the much deeper solidarity which comes from an understanding of objectives and a genuinely democratic control over the action taken to realize them. If the vitality of the Nonpartisan League is not to be limited to the inspiration of a few leaders, the individual farmer must actually direct its ventures.

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But if the leaders must in each instance await the participation of the individual farmer, the League will fail to accept many of the best opportunities for extending its power. It must move swiftly or disintegrate.

It will be difficult to make the right compromise. One course has its plain disadvantages; the other has a warning in the career of the Progressive party. That movement shaped itself to fit one leader; and when the leader stepped out into new apparel the movement fell to the ground. There are indications that a similar event may mark the future of the Nonpartisan League. Many of its members have little understanding of the League's program, but have come in simply because that is the thing their neighbors are doing. Some feel, when the payment of their dues does not automatically produce a drop in the costs of plowshares and binder-twine, that their membership in the League is not worth continuing. Few members realize toward what ultimate goal the movement is being directed. Not one in ten has anything to do with directing it there. And this the leaders of the League appreciate. It is the unfortunate but inevitable characteristic of an organization which needs autocratic management before it is steady enough to stand on its own feet. Later on the farmers can be taught to understand their objectives less opaquely, and more and more control can be put into their hands. And this may be the way in which it will work out. But it will be one of the two major problems the League faces.

The other is to find the enlarged membership without which even the most enlightened understanding and democratic control cannot make a start. Demanding the establishment of the state as a miller and banker, the Nonpartisan League cannot achieve its program without practically complete control of the state's legislative and administrative machinery. In North Dakota, where there is almost no industrial population, an appeal to the farmers alone was enough to win eight votes in ten. But as the League goes into states less exclusively agricultural it will need to attract other groups in order to become the majority power. This need the League recognizes, and hopes to see satisfied. "The most destructive agitators in the country," it declares, "are those who proclaim that there is a difference of interests between the farmer, the merchant and the wage-worker, and thus keep them divided politically." In the one year in which the League has had control of North Dakota, it has kept this maxim in mind. More has been done to attract the wage-worker than the small merchant. The League had the indorsement of the state federation of labor before the election; since then, the farmers say, "Everything that labor has asked of the legislature it has been given." Union votes were not actually needed. But appeal for them set a good precedent.

If the Nonpartisan League should go into one of the eastern states, seeking a coalition with labor, its attempt would seem certain to fail. The difficulty of reaching the great body of unorganized workmen, the traditional hesitancy of the organized workmen to go into politics as a unit—these would, for the present at least, be almost insuperable obstacles, whether the League sought to swing the existing unions into line, or to found a political organization outside the Federation. But in those states in which the League has begun to work there is less tradition among the unionists and less inertia among the unorganized men. Montana is an example. There the industrial population consists largely of miners and lumberjacks. Many of these men are dissatisfied with what they deem the slow methods of the A. F. of L.; they are a good deal afraid of the I. W. W.; and they are in search of some new means to put themselves on an economic plane where they cannot be exploited by an irresponsible employer. Here is rich ground for the Nonpartisan League. Moreover, North Dakota is near enough for the exploits of the organized farmers to be common knowledge. In Butte there are many miners who talk of one law particularly which the Nonpartisan legislature enacted in North Dakota—a law permitting farm improvements to be taxed at a lower estimation of their value than the property of railroads, banks and similar businesses might be taxed. If a farmers' movement could secure that sort of measure from its state legislature, why could not a coalition of farmers and laborers bring a similar law to Montana—plus, say, a state eight-hour day? There is, of course, no reason why it couldn't—since those who are farmers and laborers outnumber those who are not. One other advantage of the Nonpartisan League is to be at work in a field used to political innovations. New movements have always been born in the northern half of the Middle West.

And, it might be suggested, have always died there. This is true, too. But the Nonpartisan League has the further advantage of depending in no way upon the organization of a new "third party." The League can use the old parties, just as it used them, and still is using them, in North Dakota. In some counties there, in the last election, the League indorsed a Republican and a Democrat in the same county, and elected them both. It prefers to use the primary, rather than to attempt to hold together in a single organization masses of voters who do not share common economic aims. The principle of coöperation is

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already recognized in the Northwest as one of great advantage in the matter of buying and selling. The Nonpartisan League now aims to extend the principle of coöperation into politics.

It proposes, that is, a coalition in which the different groups remain independent in the pursuit of their exclusive interests, but come together for those interests which they hold in common. As the League organizes the farmers, so it would have the workmen and the small merchants organized. Within state lines there would thus be established three guilds. Each would formulate its program; the farmers, for instance, a state-owned terminal system and a state rural credits act; the workmen, perhaps an eight-hour day and a minimum wage law; the small merchants, a manipulation of the machinery of taxation which would put them on a competitive basis with their larger rivals. In each case the objective would be to achieve an economic end through the use of political machinery. The several demands of the three guilds would be pooled, their possible contradictions reconciled, and the completed program submitted to the constituents of the coalition. And these constituents, where the coalition had been effected, would invariably constitute a ruling electorate. For in any state the farmers, workmen and small merchants form the majority of the population. It is on this reckoning that the Nonpartisan League has prophesied its ultimate success in national politics.

Only rare leadership, certain and imaginative, could bring this success within reach. But the goal reveals the political philosophy of the League, and will explain many of the moves it will make in the immediate future. The opportunities it has sketched out for itself may never be realized on any large scale, though it is possible that the next election will see the League successful in at least three western states. But whatever its fortune the Nonpartisan movement will, differently from any of the political movements which preceded it in the Middle West, have a genuine effect upon the political psychology of those who take part in it. Like its predecessors it will make more difficult the practice of discrediting sensible extensions of the government into business, simply by terming them "Socialistic."

But unlike its predecessors the League is aimed at the destruction of blind political loyalty. It does not do away with an old allegiance simply to erect a new one in its place. For inherited traditions and catchword issues it substitutes the reality of economic interests, unattached to any "party." In that sense, whether or not its immediate objectives are realized, it is a revolutionary movement.

CHARLES MERZ.

Real Freedom

[From a speech made in Baltimore, November 14, 1917, at the eighteenth annual meeting of the National Consumers' League, by Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War.]

WE are taking out of industrial life a million and a half of men now. A very much larger number of women are being employed in our industries. I have no doubt that the inspectors who are charged with the duty of enforcing state child labor laws are having more and more insistent demands from employers that they relax their vigilance in the interest of the national output. I have not the least doubt, as a matter of fact, I have some very definite knowledge that employers who have contracts with the government or with the Allies, or who make things which are more or less necessary to the life of the people, are constantly saying to themselves and saying to state enforcing agencies, and they are saying to me as Secretary of War and as a member of the Council of National Defense: "This is not the time to worry about those restrictions; this is not the time to enforce these laws about children and women and their hours and conditions of labor; too large and momentous events are moving now for anybody to stop with these things."

That demand is being made everywhere. Now, the duty of the Consumers' League and of every member of it, and of everybody who knows its philosophy and believes in it, is to set his face resolutely against everything that on any pretext seeks to break down those barriers, which we have set up through years of patient labor against the enervation and dissipation of the child life and of the woman life and of the man life of this country. I think the Council of National Defense has not done very much in the direction of relaxation. I am aware of the fact that we have sometimes done things in the way of relaxation, but I think it is safe to say that the government has rather advanced the standards demanded in industry since the war began than relaxed them. As to nine-tenths of the work done for the Federal government since we went into this war, I feel perfectly certain that the conditions of hours, of pay, of sanitation and supervision under which the work is done, is better than it would have been under conditions existing prior to our entrance into the war. But I say this not to claim credit. I say it because to that extent the government has recognized this most solemn of all facts, that it will do us no good whatever to send our sons to France to fight for our political rights if, while they are waging the battle, we surrender our industrial and our social rights here at home.

We are gradually learning, I think, that liberty is of a piece with all of its qualities; which we must require, if we are to enjoy any of them. I have the right to go to Florida and spend the winter. It does me no good. I have not the time and I have not the money, so that my one-cornered liberty is an ideal possession and is enjoyed only when I have the leisure to indulge in imaginary pleasure. And so it is about political liberties. It does us no good to be able to vote for people; it does us no good to be able to call ourselves free and to describe our land as the land of the free unless we have all the component

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parts of real freedom. And that means the political liberty to recast our industrial life so that it will really be a life of opportunity to the least person who lives under it.

Now, our sons are going to France—many of them to stay, many of them to return—and when they come back they will see the Statue of Liberty. They will sail into New York harbor proud of their victories, proud of their honors. And I am filled with an exalted state of enthusiasm about the kind of armies we are sending to France. It is just such an army as a free people ought to send, an army that has ideals, in its individuals as well as in its collective mass, an army that is going upon no selfish quest, is not seeking to take something from somebody, is divorced from all ancient notions that used to bring about wars of prestige or of conquest. It is going upon a purely idealistic basis. In a certain sense they are material warriors in a spiritual warfare; and when they have finally done the thing which they must do, when they have finally established on the frontiers of France the eternal dominance of free over autocratic institutions; when they have done that they will come home; and when they come I do not want them to find a dissipated and depressed life here. I do not want them to find that they have been chasing one corner of freedom while the others have been utterly lost, but I want them to come back to wives and sisters and mothers and brothers and children filled with robust health, people who have worked in industry and commerce, people who have produced the goods upon which life depends, people who have filled the workshops and the factories and the fields with labor, done under wholesome conditions. They must find that as they were fighting at one end of the frontier and winning one corner of freedom's field, we at home were enlarging the boundaries of industrial liberty, that we were laying out new boundaries of real freedom here among ourselves, that we were enlarging the lessons we had hitherto learned of the value, the indispensableness of wholesome conditions for the people who do the labor of the world, and establishing conditions which it will be a privilege for them to come back to rather than a grief.

CORRESPONDENCE

The Anti-Suffragist Replies

SIR: You say that for an anti-suffragist to refrain from voting in New York State in order that the true quality of the suffragists' vote may be tested is putting one's "special interest above the general interest." I thought I had made it clear that I considered it to the general interest to prevent other states from voting for woman suffrage. I stated that I for one was willing, much as I love my own city and state, to permit them to suffer from an overwhelmingly radical vote just for a year or two so that the anti-suffragists should not be forced, as they have been in the past, by their very loyalty and patriotism to help the cause of their opponents. Certainly, as I explained in my letter to the Times, it is unpatriotic to refuse to vote, but one patriotic duty may sometimes be set against another, and I know only one of more importance than saving the country from woman suffrage, and that is winning the war.

At a meeting of the anti-suffrage organization, held since my letter appeared in the Times, I stated publicly that unless the entire organization were with me unanimously, there would be no point in refusing to vote, and that as perhaps only a little more than one-third present seemed to feel as I did (it did not come to a vote), I should not care to make an issue of it, nor would I advise pursuing such a course. Furthermore, I stated that if the woman suffragists persisted as they threaten, in trying to defeat all congressmen who do not promise to vote for the Federal amendment, I supposed we anti-suffragists would have to vote in order to see that those congressmen were elected. And now, mark what happened! Mrs. Arthur Dodge, that wise leader, immediately rebuked me, saying that we must consider only the fitness of the congressman and his loyalty to the country. "You would not," she said, "wish to put into Congress at such a time, a man who would not stand by the President, who would not support all war measures whatever his views upon the Federal amendment. No! You and I place our country above any controversy; at such a time the question of suffrage or non-suffrage must be of a relative unimportance."

I realized that Mrs. Dodge was right. I realized that however distasteful it is to us, we may be forced into voting to uphold the war power of the government. That is the woman whom so many have called "reactionary," who has been the butt of so much "advanced" thought, who has been probably as much hated and laughed at as any woman in the country. And yet, compare the self-sacrifice, the patriotism, the sanity of her decision with the determination of the suffragists to defeat a congressman *no matter what his record may have been* if he does not pledge himself to vote for the Federal amendment!

Yes, in persisting in their untimely struggle, in nagging the President, and speaking of him with utter disrespect, in questioning his sincerity as they have done, in demanding the vote as a "reward" of patriotic service, in giving more money to the cause of suffrage than to any war relief, in diverting women's efforts from needed war work, in fighting universal military service when it was crucial, in trying to keep this country out of war as long as possible, instead of preparing for it day and night, the leaders of the suffrage cause have been but poor patriots. "I didn't bring up my boy to be a soldier" is their true hymn; for all their belated show of loyalty the time came when pacifism received a rougher treatment than even they could stomach.

I know of few more pathetic figures than that of the anti-suffragist forced by her loyalty, forced by her love of good government to enter into the arena of politics against her will, nay, forced even by the very qualities which she brings to the electorate to strengthen the argument for suffrage in other states. Surely one did not expect those who worked for "Three in One" during the silver craze to turn around when defeated and work ardently for the Gold Standard; one does not expect the Prohibitionist, defeated, to become an ardent worker in the cause of the "Wets," but to the anti-suffragist it seems is given no credit for having convictions. We believe in the vote as a necessary expression of class interests, but we have all along contended that sex is not a class, that the individual

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is not the unit politically, but the family. We have always believed that, on the whole, men of one class represent adequately the women of their class far better than a woman of another class could represent them. We do not believe that there is a single issue upon which the separate judgment of women—all women—is required in order to obtain justice. I know New York women who feel that "the lady from Montana" represents them more than the "gentleman from New York," but it is safe to say that no anti-suffragist feels that way.

I have found that the intolerance of the so-called "liberals" is very great. I have been coolly received, even cut, for holding the opinions that I do. I have had women shake their fists in my face, I have been told by the wife of the professor who lately resigned from a great university, that I was a believer in the harem as there was no middle ground, one was either for suffrage or for the harem. I have been asked seriously in a letter if I were not suffering from some kind of atrophy of the brain; I have been told I was working for prostitution. I have had suffragists express wonder that I could so forget my principles as to write a glowing eulogy of a woman sculptor who was also a suffragist. I could go on a long time telling of the acerbities of those from whom I have differed, and yet I believe that my services for women are not entirely unknown, nor have they been slight, and I think I should not be obliged to state that my disbelief in the righteousness or wisdom of giving the vote to all women is founded on something quite different from the arguments that used to do duty fifty years ago!

I thank you for the courtesy of permitting me to speak in your columns.

ANNIE NATHAN MEYER.

New York City.

[NOTE: In justice to the New York State suffragists it should be explained that the so-called reprisals clause was voted down by them and is not a part of their program, a fact of which Mrs. Meyer was probably unaware at the time of writing this letter.—THE EDITORS.]

Welfare Work for America

SIR: In your issue of October 13th, Rebecca West very properly suggests that America should not borrow the institution of industrial welfare worker from England though the need of something constructive is at the moment quite acute. As an alternative she proposes a division of responsibility among several agencies, but the assumption that they would be efficient and capable of coördination is hardly justified by experience either in England or here. The situation demands, it seems to me, not so much a new departure in industry as a centralization of effort and skill in dealing with the human element, such as has been successfully secured in accident prevention, because well-trained and competent men, familiar with factory work, were found in the industries where the safety campaign was adopted. In all of the other branches of activity the same skill is not available.

In England, welfare supervisors, without any special training or knowledge of manufacturing, were created overnight and apparently this country is tending toward the same course. Members of the Ministry of Munitions are at this moment traveling around the eastern states offering advice on the basis of their experience though they have not yet entirely solved their own problem, nor can they succeed until the profession of trained welfare worker is established.

We need in America the establishment of such a profession. Employers would welcome the advent of specialists who have a practical and up-to-date knowledge of employment, training of men, health and sanitation, benefits, profit sharing and other matters affecting the human relation. These are highly difficult subjects, which the employer has little time to study critically and which could be readily deputed to competent professional men, if such existed. A multitude of profit sharing schemes have failed, for instance, because employers who believed in the idea had no time to investigate experience elsewhere and had no means of securing sound advice.

Three steps, therefore, seem necessary: first, all available information should be secured; second, the knowledge should be imparted to those who undertake such duties; third, there should be a central supervising agency and machinery for the acquisition and coördination of all material to create and supply standard practice. If this can be accomplished, foundations will have been laid for much better results than have been obtained in England.

J. D. HACKETT.

New York City.

No, Mr. Hard

SIR: In an effort to prove that while I am professing to advocate a general peace I actually do, or at least should, favor a separate peace. Mr. William Hard, in an open letter published in the last issue of your magazine, asks me three questions.

The questions are direct, illuminating and fair, as they naturally must be coming from a writer as talented, incisive and amiable as William Hard (now, Mr. Hard, is not that a fair equivalent for the "many very nice things" you have been good enough to say about my "personal character"?) and I am thankful for the opportunity to answer them.

Question one: If you had been a member of Congress on April 6th of this year would you have voted for war against the German Imperial Government?

Answer: No.

Reasons: If I had believed that our participation would shorten the duration of the world war and force a better, more democratic and more durable peace, I should have favored the measure regardless of the cost and sacrifices to America. My opposition to our entry in the war was based on the conviction that it would prolong the disastrous conflict without compensating gains to humanity. I also believed that the United States could better serve the cause of world peace as the one great and powerful neutral than as one of the many belligerents.

Question two: If you were a member of Congress now would you vote for appropriation bills for guns and shells to be used against the armies of the German Imperial Government?

Answer: No.

Reasons: Gigantic appropriations "for guns and shells" are part of the program "to continue the war until the armies of the German Imperial Government are beaten in the field," to borrow Mr. Hard's expression. I cannot endorse that program. I am not a "bitter-ender"—I fear that if the bitter-end policy is persisted in, the end will be bitter indeed for the peoples of all lands. I believe that the course of this war is daily demonstrating the wisdom and necessity of the desire expressed by President Wilson

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before our entry in the war for a "peace without victory." If the United States in conjunction with the Allied powers had offered to the German government a peace upon the terms first outlined by our President and substantially reiterated by the Russian republic, the Pope, and the majority of the German Reichstag, and if the German government had rejected it, insisting upon terms which would subjugate other nations, or establish a German hegemony in the world, or perpetuate the curse of universal militarism, then I should have voted for all the guns and all the shells and all resources of money and men to keep up the war until Germany consented to accept a peace that would preserve civilization.

Question three: If there were a referendum on withdrawal from the war, which way would you vote? Your political party, of which you are one of the most influential leaders, denounced our entrance into the war. It preferred the state of things existing on the day before our entrance into the war. I assume that the referendum is so worded as to mean a simple return to that state of things, with no further pledges from either side. It is so worded as to mean a sheer separate withdrawal, without qualifications. "Shall we get out?" Which way would you vote?

Answer: I would vote no.

Reasons: Wisely or unwisely our country is in the war. "A simple return to the state of things" as they existed before our entrance into the war is obviously impossible. It is one thing to remain a neutral friend of all nations and a possible peacemaker among them, and it is an entirely different thing to make common cause with one group of the belligerents, encourage them to renewed military efforts, and at the critical time abandon them to their own fate. We can no longer work for a speedy general peace as a neutral power, we must strive for it now as one of the most influential belligerents.

If the question of war or peace should be submitted to a vote of the people, I trust there would be a sufficient number of reasonable citizens to initiate an amendment to Mr. Hard's hypothetical referendum, directing our government to open immediate negotiations for a general peace upon proper terms. On such a referendum I would vote yes.

MORRIS HILLQUIT.

New York.

Would the South Let Them?

SIR: You advocate giving votes to women by Federal amendment on the ground that female suffrage is carrying state after state and had better therefore be accepted as inevitable and written into our Constitution. "The New York victory," you contend, shows "that woman suffrage can carry any state in the North and West," with possibly a few exceptions.

If this is true, what you advocate is that "the North and West" force this measure on the South, which is up to the present solidly against it. Though I am personally a believer in woman suffrage, I do not think it would be just or wise to force the policy on an unwilling South. Do you realize how much the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments are involved in this question? Those amendments guarantee—or were intended to guarantee—the suffrage to negroes. The South has, however, practically nullified them, and with the tacit consent of the North. Now a woman suffrage amendment would have the effect of formally strengthening the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments by extending the franchise equally to white and negro women. But the South, we may be sure, would nullify the new amendment, as it has nullified the former ones, and the North would again tacitly consent.

Is it an honest or a statesmanlike thing to enact a constitutional law that we know will be nullified? But perhaps you propose, when we have the amendment, to enforce it with a "force bill." Or would you have the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments repealed? For one or the other alternative is the logical and necessary course, if you would bring woman suffrage to the South by Federal amendment.

JOSEPH CADY ALLEN.

Boston, Massachusetts.

Associated Press and I. W. W.

SIR: In The New Republic, issue of October 6th, Mr. Frederick Roy Martin, assistant general manager of The Associated Press, takes exception to Mr. Charles Merz's remarks about the attitude of the press on the troubles between the I. W. W. and the Western Mine Owners, claiming that: "The Associated Press has endeavored to have its staff men wherever there have been serious disturbances and to report the happenings fairly."

Just what does Mr. Martin mean by "fairly"? Is it a fair report of any happening to report all the evil that can possibly be charged against the striking miners and lumber workers and not even give an intimation of the causes leading to their rebellion against their employers?

Were the reports sent out by The Associated Press from West Virginia regarding the miners' strike there three or four years ago fair? Those sent out from Ludlow? Those sent out from the great Mesaba Iron Range strike? Those sent out regarding the strike of the Northwestern and Louisiana lumber workers in 1912-13? As to the last, that of the Louisiana lumber workers, I assert that The Associated Press was grossly unfair to the workers in all its reports, especially those recording the trial of the fifty-eight men tried at Lake Charles, La., for the so-called "Grabow riot." I was publicity agent for the men on trial at Lake Charles and so happen to know something of that case and the extremely "fair" attitude of the reporters of The Associated Press as between the Southern Lumber Operators' Association and the Forest and Lumber Workers' Union. It may not be that the general management of The Associated Press was responsible therefor, but it is a fact that its reporters spent most of their time in the company of Burns detectives. In that bitter struggle of the terribly exploited and oppressed lumber workers of the South for something like a fair wage and human conditions of existence, all the power of the press was thrown against them and what I have always marveled at is, not that they made threats of sabotage, but that they conducted themselves as peacably as they did.

Every outrage from eviction and blacklisting to being strapped to logs and whipped was visited upon them, yet The Associated Press was silent as to all they suffered, the deep causes that led to their desperate rebellion. They were charged, just as the miners and lumber workers of the West are being charged today, with *intending* to commit every crime in the calendar, and some that were not. One of the most lurid charges was that they intended to set the forests on fire, when, as a matter of truth, the southern forests will not burn—it is a fact that fires are often set in the winter to burn the grass and underbrush out of these forests.

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I do not charge The Associated Press management with being responsible for all this, but the cases I have cited above, to say nothing of the pall of silence thrown over the Mooney case in San Francisco, is fast placing The Associated Press in a position where no one believes a word it says about any great strike or labor trial. The workers now simply expect its dispatches to do all possible to prejudice their case; expect it to first raise a storm, such as that which preceded the arrest of Haywood and the other officers of the I. W. W., all of which was against the workers, and then to shut off all the news, especially that favorable to the unionists, while they are in jail and being tried.

I assert that such tactics on the part of so powerful an organization as is The Associated Press is neither in the interests of the government nor to the welfare of the American people as a whole, for if it will not give a fair and impartial report of such vital happenings, the people and the government are left in the dark as to what measures and remedies will best relieve the economic pressure causing these desperate revolts of great masses of men, for men do not go on strike and face hunger and prison for no cause whatsoever. Justice is the bulwark of free government; suppression its greatest enemy.

COVINGTON HALL.

Dallas, Texas.

Our Modern Heretic Burners

SIR: After a silence so profound and long-continued that it has struck like a frost to the heart of true American liberalism, the President has at last spoken out in deprecation of government by mob rule. And though the force of his censure is greatly mitigated by the question-begging assumption that those who have suffered from the lawlessness that has been sweeping this country are themselves exemplars of lawlessness, we must still be deeply grateful for the utterance. What will be its practical effect? We can only wait and see.

Meanwhile, can you not persuade Professor Dewey to give your readers a more detailed explanation (if such is possible) of the psychological processes by which a war fought to break down the organized principle of lawlessness and violence abroad is made the justification for nearly every sort of lawlessness and violence at home? The wild and whirling words of Dr. Manning, Dr. Hillis, Dr. Van Dyke, and other of our spiritual shepherds are perhaps in the natural course; the lethal tendencies of clergymen have been notorious through many centuries. "Whin they're ca'm," says Mr. Dooley, "they'd wipe out all th' laws, and whin they're excited they'd wipe out all th' popylation. They're niver two jumps fr'm th' thumbscrew." But the flaming advocacy of lynch law and mob justice on the part of so many of our astute and unemotional and hitherto law-abiding men of affairs is another and more inexplicable matter. Mr. Root would have the editors of certain publications shot at sunrise; ex-Ambassador Gerard would "feed every pacifist raw meat, and hang every traitor to a lamp-post"; ex-Governor Warfield of Maryland would "gladly lead a mob" against Dr. Muck if the latter dared attempt giving a concert in Baltimore; and so on and so on. Half the war utterances recorded in our newspapers are a naïve and curious combination of eloquential thunder against Prussianism abroad and unabashed advocacy of Prussianism at home. The problem of domestic government in war-time is seemingly no problem at all to many of our best citizens. Like Mitchener in Mr. Shaw's Press Cuttings, they believe that there is really no such thing as public opinion. "There are certain persons who entertain certain opinions. Well, shoot them down. When you have shot them down, there are no longer any persons entertaining those opinions alive: consequently there is no longer any more of the public opinion you are so much afraid of. Grasp that fact, and you have grasped the secret of government. Public opinion is mind. Mind is inseparable from matter. Shoot down the matter and you kill the mind."

But, to close upon a graver note, it is worth pointing out that none of the sinister denials of democracy which are just now so plentiful in this country issue from the training camps or the regiments departing for the slaughter-pits of France. From those quarters we hear only songs and jests and high-hearted avowals of devotion to the ugly task ahead. And one cannot but wonder if the new world-order that is to be reared in the blood and agony of these brave youths will be an embodiment of *their* spirit, or the spirit of our elderly heretic-burners. Is the coming democracy to be shaped and controlled by men whose brains and hearts have long been hardened, men hostile to change, intolerant of divergent opinion, skeptical of popular government, men of closed minds and backward vision and petulant temper? Or will it be an embodiment of the spirit of youth, generous, just, tolerant, eager to test all things, to give to every man and every idea its due chance, loving liberty and abhorring coercion, believing above everything else in the democratic idea of progress by all through all? That is the most momentous question before the world today.

WALDO R. BROWNE.

Wyoming, New York.

Vehement, Perverse, Zigzag, Sibilant

SIR: A good deal of mischief may be done by the vehement efforts to introduce itself of a new journal, not satisfied with the expectation of a growing appreciation of its really good intellectual quality. Throwing rocks at random into the stream is a way of producing a noticeable eddy. Perverse attitudes, contrary to the stream of common sense, give a false air of originality. Let the readers of The New Republic be patient with its sometimes provoking and zigzag course, as it will doubtless "find itself" before long; meanwhile paying little heed to vagaries which are intended to attract attention, rather than to convince.

The claim once made that the "Entente Allies" would cast suspicion upon their motives, and weaken their cause by not pausing to consider a "patchwork" peace, was one of the almost too obvious demonstrations of an advertising purpose. All the "Allied world" knew and knows that traps, more and more temptingly baited, as time went on, would be set by the Germans with their black designs. (As the boy said: "The cellar is dark but smells of cheese!") There should be no notice taken of the Vatican's pious blindness or of Russia's pitiful weakness, or of The New Republic's sibilant echoes—nor yet of Eliot's kindly solicitude.

The full disclosure of Germany's long planned attack upon civilization and its horrible crimes have finally demonstrated as the necessary end of the war for world peace, the absolute, unconditional surrender of the Central Powers.

ERVING WINSLOW.

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At the Capitol

Issues of the New Session

INTERNATIONAL affairs, of course, outweigh in importance other matters which may become the business of the Congress which convenes on Monday. While that Congress is in session there will be coming up questions of unity of Allied control and action, new peace offensives from Germany, new opportunities for political pressure in Russia, new demands for a restatement of Allied terms. In this session Congress will have constant temptation to take a hand in diplomacy.

For such a course precedents, which always weigh heavily in Congress, are available. The joint resolution which authorized intervention in Cuba embodied a congressional declaration of war aims as well as an actual declaration of war. At one time or another Congress has taken the initiative in Pan-American diplomacy, in negotiations with France, Mexico, and Spain. The House has, in fact, gone so far as to declare, after we had begun fighting with Mexico in 1846, that the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President."

During the coming session, however, it is not likely that Congress will seek such precedents as these. Shortly before adjournment in October there were signs of a growing desire in Congress to participate more actively in the directing of the war. For instance, Senator Sherman, not one of the group charged with disloyalty, wanted to know if the American people were to be denied the opportunity "to discuss, to analyze and to weigh" war aims "until their elected public officials have irrevocably committed them to the performance of something of which they are ignorant and on which their votes have never been taken!" The answer, he thought, must come from Congress. Probably most congressmen think so. But not many will say so, while numerous colleagues and a large portion of the press are ready to call discussion of war aims unpatriotic. Suspicions often are easily aroused. When Mr. London stated in the last session that the President's reply to the Pope "assures the world that he is opposed, first, to an economic alliance," Mr. Sanford took the floor and raised a point of order. For what purpose? "I make the point of order," declared Mr. Sanford, "to protect the public interest." Gentlemen protecting the public interest are likely to ward off all save oratorical discussion of foreign affairs during the coming session, unless the President chooses to have it otherwise. Left to itself, the war party in Congress will consist of those who want a bitter end war and those who make no public speeches.

But it will not be too early to begin being dissenters in domestic affairs. In Congress, as in many quarters outside of it, there is a dual code of patriotic morality. A congressman who suggests that the administration is failing to encourage democratic discussion of war aims is likely to be charged with undermining popular confidence in the government. Not so with the congressman who rises aggressively to challenge the good sense of the administration at home. To such criticism much time in the coming session will be devoted. Incompetency was beginning to be an issue last summer. Charges were made in both houses that the administration was closing absurd contracts for shoes and cots, ships and cantonments. Senator Harding, whose loyalty has not been questioned, once asserted that he could "stand upon this floor to-day with criticism well founded and substantiated by facts which would prove a sensation to the hundred millions of Americans who are on the anxious seat." But no facts could be drawn from him. And in the interval since that remark was made, members of Congress have had opportunity to visit their districts and learn, among other things, the locally circulating stories of squandered funds and blankets sold to an uncle in the Ordnance Department at three hundred per cent. profit. Ridiculous charges will be made; genuine instances of poor management, due to deadwood in departmental organization and a lack of centralized powers of direction and purchase, will be pointed out. In such instances Congress will be wise to fix responsibility specifically in the administration. But, instead, the Republican members will probably propose some sort of joint congressional committee still further to subdivide responsibility.

One other set of issues that will demand attention during the coming session will be those arising from conditions of industrial unrest. Congress cannot show its remarkable indifference of the last session to the dangers this unrest may develop. Labor conditions are less satisfactory than when we went to war. Though Mr. Gregory's Department has never made so many arrests, Mr. Wilson's Department has never had so many strikes. In the last five months federal investigators have gone into 295 labor disputes, as compared with 52 in the previous five months. Prosecution of foreign agents and of those leaders who preach violence is necessary, but it cannot be effective unless supplemented by some method of removing causes of labor dissatisfaction at their source.

Part of the responsibility for present labor troubles rests directly with Congress. Last April the Secretary of Labor went to the Capitol and pointed out that it would be short-sighted to spend two billion dollars for cannon and army supplies without making as certain as possible that the production of cannon and army supplies would not be crippled by strikes and labor shortages. He asked for $150,000 to strengthen his Department's conciliation bureau and $750,000 for employment service work. Congress decided that, inasmuch as conciliation agents and employment services were not shot from a gun, they were not strictly emergency war appropriations and could afford to wait. Six months later the Secretary was given less than half of what he asked.

This absurd situation Congress can remedy, if it chooses, early in the session. Of course, financial checks upon the Labor Department are only one reason why industrial order is wanting. An attack more varied than the increasing of appropriations is necessary. In the first part of the war a committee of inquiry into industrial unrest was established in England. When it reported it was with the warning that "no tinkering will meet the requirements of the situation." The chief causes of unrest it found to be (1) food prices; (2) profiteering; (3) industrial fatigue; (4) inequality of sacrifice; (5) uncertainty as to the future; (6) want of confidence in the government. There is no factor here with which we are not already familiar in our own industrial situation.

With certain factors Congress has already attempted to deal, and with the others it might make some headway unassisted by the executive. But the inauguration of a national labor policy can best start from the President. So can a revitalization of foreign policy and an overhauling of the war machine. Congress will need to grant certain additional powers. But for the three issues certain to cause most concern in Congress during the coming session responsibility will rest with the administration. Time will be saved if Congress recognizes the fact.

C. M.

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Perhaps

Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman. New York: George H. Doran Co. $1.50.

WHEN the more impartial post-bellum histories of the war are written, volumes like Mr. Ackerman's will have become invaluable source-books. And this solely because of the facts presented, not because of any insight. Subtract the official speeches and notices which are common property to all investigators even today, the individual opinion, the more familiar historical events, the quotations from newspapers and magazines—what remains is, to be sure, meagre. Yet it is fresh and authentic. If a conventional journalist, Mr. Ackerman is also an honest and enterprising one. During the first two years of the war he was sympathetic towards Germany and believed her, as he is frank in stating, "conscientiously defending herself against a group of powers which desired her destruction." He was therefore able to obtain with Count Tisza, Generals von Kluck and von Falkenhayn, Zimmermann and von Jagow, interviews of a less stereotyped and "inspired" kind than those given to the guardedly hostile correspondents who could not forget Belgium. Indefatigable in his search for news, he contrived to avoid the worst of the "special writer" clichés. He tells of the Bavarian General von Kirchoff who, when presented by the Kaiser with a high military order, broke down and wept, saying that the decoration was not his but his soldiers'. In spite of their gallant sacrifice of life and fortune for the Fatherland, the General lamented, they were still called "Huns and Barbarians" by the enemy. Mr. Ackerman tells of the illuminating notice on the wall of the chief telegraph office in Berlin, dated August 2nd, 1914, to the effect that, because of a state of war, service was suspended between Germany and these nine countries—England, France, Russia, Japan, Belgium, Italy, Servia, Montenegro and Portugal. Eventually, as we know, all these enemies were added to Germany's long list, but the notice was only less remarkable in its haste than in its suspiciously accurate prevision of later events. With random generosity Mr. Ackerman supplies these and other equally pregnant facts.

Now to disagree with Mr. Ackerman's interpretation of his facts does not necessarily imply that one maintains the opposed or pacifistic view. It means rather a criticism of his plausibility. For instance, his shift from a sympathetic attitude towards Germany to an openly hostile one is not sufficiently explained. Even when Mr. Ackerman gives two pages of reasons why we did wisely and correctly in declaring war on Germany the argument is thin, without grip. There is no real emotional drive back of these reasons; they seem intellectual after-thoughts. Is it not significant that not a word about Belgium can be found in these two pages? The hate motif, too, is conspicuously absent.

So many flagrant inconsistencies appear in Mr. Ackerman's book because, I believe, his viewpoint towards our entrance into the war is the result of a reasoned rather than a felt conviction. His disunity of belief is evidenced not, of course, explicitly, but by contradictory interpretations. To reconcile his early statement that Wilson's two years of diplomatic patience and appeal to public opinion did more to liberalize Germany than all of England's and France's attacks in the field with his later statement that only a crushing military victory for the Allies will free Germany of her autocratic rulers—such a task would require more dialectical skill than Mr. Ackerman possesses. Nor do his many statements about the reaction of the German public to "inspired" governmental propaganda present an altogether unified picture. Towards the end of his book M. Ackerman speaks rather despairingly of the docility of German public opinion. Nothing, he says, can break that fatal hypnotic spell except defeat. Yet in other passages he tells of secret protest meetings, labor revolts, subterranean pamphlets, etc. There the implication plainly is that the German people, after many disillusions and much bitterness, are beginning to think for themselves. Which is true? There is, again, a similar inconsistency in his discussion of the vexed food problem. If Germany is compelled to go through two more winters, he writes, on one page, she will certainly have to surrender. Barring, of course, anything untoward like a separate peace or a decisive submarine spurt, most students of Germany's food and industrial situation agree that the sands of her economic hour-glass have nearly run out. But on another page Mr. Ackerman takes a very different tone when he writes, "Germany can keep on until she is decisively defeated militarily." Correspondents are perhaps tempted to reach conclusions so stimulating to the ready militarists of the United States, yet it is doubtful if there is any conscious trimming of conclusions in Mr. Ackerman's book. One cannot believe that he wishes to be other than wholly fair. His inconsistencies are those of the direct and blundering type which come from an inner bewilderment.

To the alert reader, however, Mr. Ackerman presents a more veracious picture of Germany than would be presented by any forced attempt to keep his sketch in one color. He does humanize the specious Gargantua of popular newspapers, the hydra-headed giant who never fails to think as one and to act as one, always malicious and always cruel. Mr. Ackerman confirms what even the most unenlightened opinion has recently come to see is more than a suspicion, that there are two Germanys to-day, the governmental and official minority clique of proud boasts and dull perceptions, and the saddened, much embittered, hungry and rebellious Germany of the masses. Even Prince zu Hohenlohe can write today, "Confidence in those who are directing the affairs of the Empire is beginning to crumble among the German people." The submarine, a failure; a fourth winter agony of war, almost a certainty —even in spite of Italy and Russia, in fact almost because of them. Gone is the old pan-Slavic menace, the trump card of the militarists. Gone is the once "sacred union" of the political factions. Gone even is much of the ancient arrogance and well-directed venom. Instead of singing hymns of hate, the people dream now of rapprochements and peace. Mr. Ackerman reveals the early origins of this ever-growing fissure in the outwardly solid German edifice.

Especially in his discussion of diplomatic events does he show the beginning of the division of Germany into two main camps. When many of us in America were wondering why Germany seemed to be deliberately breaking her first submarine pledges—a record which culminated in the sinking of the Sussex—it was not known that the foreign office, under Hollweg, was doing its level best to live up to them, but that the Admiralty gave orders wholly on its own account. The attitude of the Admiralty was this, to go ahead on its own responsibility and then use the Foreign Office merely to extricate it from the results of deliberate bad faith. When the Sussex was sunk, for instance, Zimmermann, however much of a poor diplomatist otherwise, was astonished. He refused to believe, honestly refused to believe, that a German submarine was respon-

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sible until presented with irrefragable evidence. Every time a crisis arose the Admiralty and the Junkers tried to capture public opinion by placing the blame either on England for her blockade or on us for our munitions shipments. To put it brutally, the game was to exploit the people's sufferings, making either England or America responsible. But for several months after the Sussex episode this amiable plan failed to work. The people were suspicious, and Hollweg had his temporary victory for moderation. So bitter, indeed, was the internal fight between the von Tirpitz party and the liberal opposition, Mr. Ackerman reports, that the fearful English blows on the Somme were overshadowed. The struggle that interested Germany was the domestic political struggle. Wilson tried to encourage the Hollweg party in his note to all belligerents asking them to state their war aims. The Junkers shuffled the issue and "stalled," hoping that the Entente would blunder. Mr. Ackerman is not especially kind to Allied diplomacy. "Nothing which had happened during the year," he writes, "so solidified the German nation as the Allies' replies to Berlin and President Wilson. It proved to the German people that their Government was waging a defensive war." In other words, the public backed the von Tirpitz party whom hitherto they had begun to doubt when it said its object was just to defend the Fatherland. The submarine was unleashed.

But the struggle has started again in much the same terms, now that the submarine has failed to bring peace. Why does not the government say the magic word Belgium, the German masses are again asking. The old doubt as to whether it is or is not a defensive war has arisen. President Wilson's assurance that there is to be no "war after the war" is the one statesmanlike utterance since February that has helped to increase the German people's suspicion of their own Government. Yet it is not sufficient, and our "bitter end" newspapers are still merrily playing the Junkers' game. Certainly we shall never liberalize Germany by talking of historic injustices, by anticipatory dividing up of Turkey and amateurish solutions of the Austro-Hungarian tangle, by raking up old atrocity tales and breathing mighty words about indemnities. If Mr. Ackerman's book proves nothing else, it proves that much. Yet it proves more. It proves that the German people are desperately weary of the war, that they have begun to suspect their government's omniscience. If the submarine, the disunion in Russia and the military successes in Italy cannot bring peace, they are asking, if anything that the military machine can do can ever bring it. This lack of faith, this suffering and suspicion, are all Allied assets, if we care to make use of them. One year, two years—and Germany must collapse, her economic and industrial life run out, with no more "menace" left in her than in an exploded shell. Without markets, without access to raw materials, she is ruined, and the people of Germany are beginning to realize it. It has been said before, but will bear constant reiteration—there is a fund of bitterness and misery in Germany today. Mr. Ackerman's description of it is of something pitiful and tragic. At present most of Germany's anger at her plight is focused against her external enemies. With tact, with generosity, with honesty, with vision and imagination, we could turn this anger of the German people against the autocracy. We can kill the myth of a defensive war. Then indeed we may not have to wait generations before Germany is the next Republic. Germany is anxious to be free, but anxious also not to be powerless.

H. S.

Mr. Huneker's Zoo

Unicorns, by James Huneker. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $1.75.

MR. HUNEKER'S thirteenth book finds him still in the full flood of his eager, lusty appreciations. He is our gourmand of literature and art, with an enormous appetite, and an unflagging gusto of palate. At any hour of day he is ready to sit down to a full course dinner of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Each book is a banquet, with the proteids, carbohydrates, fats, acids, of cultural nourishment distributed in a scientific manner. No one could put away more calories of spiritual energy than Mr. Huneker. He has the air of taking you to an opulent restaurant. He runs over the menu card with his practised eye. He knows what to order, he knows what is best, and you let him gorge you with the admirable meal. How many new and spicy dishes from the cultural cuisine of nineteenth-century Europe did we first learn of from James Huneker! How many of our first appreciations were infected by his exuberance! And if it was usually Mr. Huneker who was the first to be cordial, have we not seen most of his cordialities ratified by general approval?

After all that he has done for us, it seems a little ungrateful to be bored with Unicorns. The title beguiles, but the book contains only an unrelated series of causeries and reviews that have appeared in various papers during the last ten years, about Macdowell, Artzibashef, Cézanne, James Joyce, George Moore, Remy de Gourmont, Henry James, and others. Why they are all unicorns, or why they are any more unicornish than the "egoists" or "iconoclasts," the first chapter does not explain, and we are left to wonder if post-modern music has not corrupted even Mr. Huneker's sense of literary form. Mr. Huneker is not only a gourmand but an omnivorous gossip, and both his gossip and his reminiscence begin to run a little thin. Now that he has given us a book with scarcely a new magical name to confound and fascinate us, is it to be his misfortune to find his public, whose taste he has so insistently stretched, turning hypercritical on him? Now that he has ceased to tickle our palates with new and exciting flavors, is our fickle heart going to punish him? We begin to wonder if there is not something provincial in a cosmopolitanism which takes such sheer delight in the mere cultural menus. Unicorns is strewn more thickly than ever with names and allusions, apparently from the animal joy of having them to strew. On one page, Mr. Finck, Mary Hallock, Debussy, Mozart, Philip Hale, Arthur Rimbaud, Rene de Ghil, Illowski, Richard Strauss, Scriabine and Modest Altschuler. On another, Proudhon, Rabelais, de Gourmont, Baudelaire, Barrès, Rousseau. Open anywhere at random, and you will find on one page more names, quotations, references than any mind could possibly have anything to say about in a dozen pages. Mr. Huneker has really never gotten over that juvenility which makes every review or criticism a kind of show-window exhibit of everything one has in stock on one's intellectual shelves. The objection to this gluttonous allusiveness is that the unacquainted reader is touched with depression at this vast learning, while the acquainted reader demands a closer significance than this light skipping touch.

How very skipping that touch may be Mr. Huneker betrays in confessions like this from the paper on Artzibashef, "As I can't read Russian, I am forced to fall back on translations, and they seldom give an idea of personal rhythm, unless it be a Turgenev translating into Russian

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the Three Tales of his friend Flaubert." Was there ever a blither turning one's back on one's ignorance? Is it unkind to ask, if Mr. Huneker can't read Russian, how he is so sure of the "personal rhythm" of Turgenev's translation? And a few lines down, "of course we miss the caressing cadence and rich sonorousness of the organ-toned Russian language." Is it unkind to wonder how many other cadences and sonorousnesses in literature and art Mr. Huneker has been hearing in "languages" that he can't read? Does the soundness of critical judgments justify so vivacious a critic in passing them on to us second-hand?

For a mind of such liveliness Mr. Huneker's gossip is singularly impersonal. Music-mad, he went to Paris in 1878, impelled by a parching desire to see Franz Liszt. But his adventures among musicians might have happened to almost anybody for all they taste of personal flavor. George Moore soaked himself in the same Parisian world, but nothing happened to him that was not touched with his own languid impudence. In his gossip, he receives you yawning in his study. Mr. Huneker talks to you in the crowded restaurant, where everything might be overheard and he doesn't very much care if it is. So Mr. Huneker remains a brilliant journalist, instead of developing into an American critic who would respond to the large currents and counter-currents with an individual competence of appreciation. His enormous acquaintance and reference is a symptom of immersion, not of saturation. He has always swum gloriously, but he never gets wet through with the salt of discrimination. He knows everything that is good, but he can hardly sift out the different kinds of goodness. He has taught many Americans to swim, but it is something more than sport and the pleasures of the cultural table that we are searching for now.

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Recent Publications

The Adirondacks, by T. Morris Longstreth. New York: The Century Co. $2.50.

MR. LONGSTRETH, is not a Thoreau, but he is a first-rate observer and an amusing raconteur. He can reflect the glories of trout-fishing and swimming. He has the insinuating charm of the born walker. There is a real provocative quality to his descriptions of the splendor of the autumn woods, the real naturalist's affection for the animals—the wildcats, fox, woodchuck, squirrel, the birds. A generous number of photographs tempt the neophyte explorer, and for those who want to be explicit the Century Company has furnished a thoroughly informative map.

Psychological Tests: A Bibliography. New York: Bureau of Educational Experiments. 25 cents.

ALL the more important investigators in the field of mental tests are noted in this bibliography, with a few exceptions. These exceptions include Thorndike's Measurements, Kelly's Teachers' Marks and Educational Guidance, W. A. McCall's Correlation of Some Psychological and Educational Measurements, McCall and Thorndike's Ventilation in Relation to Mental Work, and J. Crosby Chapman's Individual Differences in Ability and Improvement, all which appeared in the Teachers' College Series of the Columbia University Contributions to Education. Omitted references of a more general kind but still of importance as a background to the study are Tredgold's Mental Deficiency, Healy's The Individual Delinquent, Scripture's Stuttering and Lisping, Drigdale's The Jukes and McCullough's The Ishmaelites. Had the arrangement been more scientifically subdivided—say main divisions of (1) methods of measurements, (2) results, (3) correlations, (4) general psychological background, (5) mental deficiency—many omitted references would probably have been included. But even with these minor defects the bibliography fills a great need, for no other adequate bibliography on the subject has been published since 1914.

The Food Problem, by Vernon Kellogg and Alonzo E. Taylor. Preface by Herbert Hoover. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.25.

WHATEVER errors our Food Administration may make ought not to come from ignorance. More data on food control than on anything else have been accumulated by Germany and the Allies since the beginning of the war. In this book the experience of other nations has been assimilated and hints are given of the mistakes we can avoid. We do not have to pass emergency legislation and undertake drastic control in the blindness of mere good intentions. For example, maximum prices for a food commodity seem to many enthusiasts a panacea for all ills, but the experience of France, England and Italy as well as Germany show that the economic reaction of such a measure may be the exact opposite of what is desired. Often the effect is to make the commodity—unless practically all the functions of the producer, the middleman and retailer are taken over by the government—disappear from the market.

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One of the Illustrations from "There's Pippins and Cheese to Come"

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Germany's experience is shown to be illuminating. Contrary to the previous predictions of her own dietetic experts she has found it possible to reduce the food ration for some twenty million industrial workers 33 per cent below the minimum set as the standard of healthy nutrition. This, so far, without any serious loss to those on the ration other than loss of weight and slight decrease in industrial efficiency. But the social cost has been severe. The agrarian class and the peasants who selfishly hoard food for their own use live at the expense, so to speak, of the workers. It is this lack of equitable food distribution in Germany which makes any increased outside economic pressure by the Allies of value in promoting political disaffection within the Central Empires. As the authors of this book view it, that, rather than any hope of starving Germany out, is the real strategic advantage of the blockade.

Mr. Hoover contributes a preface which is chiefly a sensible exhortation, but he warns specifically against the encouragement of grain production at the expense of cattle and swine. The European demand for meat products will be enormous—because it is easier to recover fields than herds. Dr. Taylor explains what is meant by the technology of food use in four chapters that are revelations of the great psychological, sociological and geographical factors that must be considered in any régime of food allowance. Our own problem is stated much more specifically than it is solved. It is difficult to see how, even at an optimistic estimate of the accomplishments in conserving food, eliminating middle-men, arranging substitute food, etc. proposed by the Food Administration, our surplus of wheat can be raised to the necessary amount needed by the Allies. Yet it is probably better for publicity purposes to overstate rather than to understate the problem. The present admirably clear book will make the patriotic reader rather painfully conscious of the enormous difficulties in our food situation.

Brahmadarsanam or Intuition of the Absolute, by Sri Ananda Acharya. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.25.

ALTHOUGH this book constitutes a first-class popular introduction to Hindoo philosophy, it is perhaps more significant as a sign of the twentieth century attitude of the east towards western culture. To be frank, that attitude is almost patronizing. The purely empirical nature of European science is emphasized rather severely, in contrast to the older habit of humility before the conqueror's achievements. New India is less docile intellectually, and it is ready even to read lessons to all the naïve western philosophers since the Greeks. But this forgivable self-assurance does not prevent the volume from furnishing lucid expositions and clearly coördinated historical data. In an index of terms, the author attempts a workable definition of the more often encountered Sanskrit terms. The definitions are not less easily remembered for being unconventional.

Contributors

to this issue

WILLIAM HARD is a graduate of Northwestern University, Illinois, and has also studied in England. He has contributed articles on economics and politics to various periodicals and is the author of The Women of Tomorrow.

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